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A bstract
In this thesis, I theoretically investigate three related aspects of international 
trade and economic development.
First, I present a model of social learning about the suitability of local 
conditions for new business ventures and explore its implications for the mi­
croeconomic patterns of economic development. I show that: i) firms tend to 
‘rush’ into business ventures with which other firms have had surprising suc­
cess thus causing development to be ‘lumpy’; ii) sufficient business confidence 
is crucial for fostering economic growth; iii) development may involve wave­
like patterns of growth where successive business ventures are first pursued 
and then given up; iv) there is, nevertheless, no guarantee that firms pursue 
the best venture even in the long-run.
Second, I offer a new explanation for the empirical finding that trade liber­
alization increases firm productivity. In particular, I develop a simple general 
equilibrium model of trade in which trade liberalization leads to outsourcing 
as firms focus on their core competencies in response to tougher competition. 
Since firms are better at performing tasks the closer they are to their core 
competencies, this outsourcing increases firm productivity.
Third, I propose a novel theory of GATT/WTO negotiations which solves 
two important problems of the standard terms-of-trade theory. First, it is 
consistent with the fact that GATT/WTO regulations do not constrain export 
taxes. Second, it does not rely on the terms-of-trade argument but instead 
emphasizes market access considerations. To achieve this, I consider trade 
policy in a ‘new trade’ environment. I first argue that tariffs are inefficiently
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high in the non-cooperative equilibrium because countries attempt to improve 
their relative market access at the expense of other countries. I then show 
how GATT/WTO negotiations can help countries overcome this inefficiency 
by providing new rationales for the GATT/WTO principles of reciprocity and 
nondiscrimination.
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1 Introduction
In this thesis, I theoretically investigate three related aspects of international 
trade and economic development.
First, I develop a new model of technology adoption in which firms learn 
about the suitability of local conditions for new business ventures from ob­
serving other firms. This model delivers four main results. First, I show that 
firms tend to ‘rush’ into business ventures with which other firms have had 
surprising success thus causing development to be ‘lumpy’. One implication 
of this ‘lumpiness’ is that improvements in the economic environment (poli­
cies, institutions, infrastructure, etc.) which trigger entry into unexplored 
business ventures can potentially kick-start economic development. Second, 
I demonstrate that sufficient business confidence is crucial for fostering eco­
nomic growth. If firms have overly pessimistic initial beliefs, viable business 
ventures remain unattempted, whereas overly optimistic beliefs never make 
firms pursue non-viable ventures permanently. However, even if initial beliefs 
are sufficiently optimistic, viable ventures may be abandoned if firms misin­
terpret the evidence available to them. Third, I establish that development 
may involve a wave-like pattern of growth where successive business ventures 
are first pursued and then given up until a venture is found for which local 
conditions are sufficiently suitable. Finally, I show that, despite this potential 
‘stuttering’ towards a viable venture, there is no guarantee that firms pursue 
the best venture even in the long-run. This model is introduced and developed 
in detail in the second chapter.
Second, I offer a new explanation for the empirical finding that trade liber­
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alization increases firm productivity. In the context of a simple general equi­
librium model of trade, I show that trade liberalization leads to outsourcing 
as firms focus on their core competencies in response to tougher competi­
tion. Since firms are better at performing tasks the closer they are to their 
core competencies, this outsourcing then increases firm productivity. Besides 
establishing this result, I also investigate the links between various technolog­
ical parameters and outsourcing. In particular, I analyse how technological 
progress, changes in fixed costs, and changes in internal governance costs af­
fect firms’ integration decisions. This model is introduced and developed in 
detail in the third chapter.
Third, I propose a new theory of GATT/WTO negotiations which solves 
two important problems of the standard terms-of-trade theory. First, it is con­
sistent with the fact that GATT/WTO regulations do not constrain export 
taxes. Second, it does not rely on the terms-of-trade argument but instead 
emphasizes market access considerations. To achieve this, I consider trade 
policy in a monopolistically competitive environment. I first argue that tar­
iffs are inefficiently high in the non-cooperative equilibrium because countries 
attempt to improve their relative market access at the expense of other coun­
tries. I then show how GATT/WTO negotiations can help countries overcome 
this inefficiency by providing new rationales for the fundamental GATT/WTO 
principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination. This model is introduced and 
developed in detail in the fourth chapter.
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2 A Gold Rush Theory of Economic Developm ent
2 .1  In trod u ction
Technology transfers are a prerequisite for many new business ventures in 
developing countries. This tends to make the prospects of such ventures hard 
to  predict, as it is often unclear how suitable local conditions are for the 
transferred technology. 1 The experiences of pioneering firms play an important 
role in reducing this uncertainty. Their success with new business ventures 
is indicative of the suitability of local conditions, thus revealing information 
useful in guiding other firms’ investment decisions.2
Under these conditions, firms not only learn from their own experience 
but also from the experiences of other firms so that knowledge about the 
suitability of local conditions for new business ventures is acquired through 
a process of social learning. In this chapter, I develop a model of such so­
cial learning and explore its implications for the microeconomic patterns of 
growth. In this model, firms update their prior beliefs about the suitability 
of local conditions for particular business ventures in a Bayesian fashion by 
observing their own experience and the experiences of other firms with these 
ventures. Four main results emerge from the analysis. First, I show that 
firms tend to ‘rush’ into business ventures with which other firms have had 
surprising success thus causing development to be ‘lumpy’. One implication
1 Rosenberg (1982, p. 249), for example, writes that "the successful transfer of technology 
is not a matter of transporting a piece of hardware from one geographic location to another 
(but) depends greatly upon the specific domestic circumstances in the recipient country". 
Evenson and Westphal (1995, pp. 2262-2263) emphasize that "the body of case study 
research and anecdotal evidence includes numerous cases of failure to achieve the minimum 
mastery needed to attain the levels of productivity expected when the physical investment 
was undertaken. It also includes numerous cases of unforeseen success in achieving sufficient 
mastery to exceed the expected levels of productivity".
2Evenson and Westphal (1995), for example, cite several cases of such a technology dif­
fusion from pioneering firms to imitators.
12
of this ‘lumpiness’ is that improvements in the economic environment (poli­
cies, institutions, infrastructure, etc.) which trigger entry into unexplored 
business ventures can potentially kick-start economic development. Second, 
I demonstrate that sufficient business confidence is crucial for fostering eco­
nomic growth and development. If firms have overly pessimistic initial beliefs, 
viable business ventures remain unattempted, whereas overly optimistic be­
liefs never make firms pursue non-viable ventures permanently. However, even 
if initial beliefs are sufficiently optimistic, viable ventures may be abandoned 
if firms misinterpret the evidence available to them. Third, I establish that 
development may involve a wave-like pattern of growth where successive busi­
ness ventures are first pursued and then given up until a venture is found for 
which local conditions are sufficiently suitable. Finally, I show that, despite 
this potential ‘stuttering’ towards a viable venture, there is no guarantee that 
firms pursue the best venture even in the long-run.
Case study evidence suggests that this ‘lumpiness’ and the associated ‘stut­
tering’ towards a viable business venture seem to be important characteristics 
of the microeconomic pattern of growth and that the above mentioned so­
cial learning plays an important role in bringing about such ‘lumpiness’ and 
‘stuttering’. Regarding ‘lumpiness’, Rhee (1990), for example, reports that 
Bangladesh’s garment industry experienced a sudden and rapid takeoff in the 
late 1980s due to the wide imitation of a surprisingly successful initial busi­
ness venture of the Daewoo Corporation of Korea.3 In a related paper, Rhee 
and Belot (1990) point out that the astonishing success of the Colombian
3 Interestingly, Rhee (1990) points out that Daewoo did not have much confidence in the 
project reflecting the uncertain success of technology transfers. It mainly viewed the venture 
as a vehicle to get involved in some of Bangladesh’s other industries.
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cut flower industry originated in a single surprisingly successful investment 
of an American entrepreneur which was then imitated by local entrepreneurs. 
Burgess and Venables (2004) present further evidence that development is of­
ten ‘lumpy’ and conclude that ‘lumpiness’ is an important characteristic of 
the microeconomic pattern of growth. As for the ‘stuttering’ towards a vi­
able business venture, an interesting example is provided by Urquiola et al. 
(1999) who report that the recent growth of the agricultural sector in low­
land Bolivia was driven by successive booms of rice, cotton, sugar cane, and 
finally soybeans.4 As is pointed out by Arrieta et al. (1990, pp. 221-258), the 
unfavourable local conditions (in particular climate and soil) were among the 
main reasons why the booms of rice, cotton, and sugar cane all came to an 
end eventually.
To the best of my knowledge, this chapter is the first attempt to explore 
the implications of social learning about the suitability of local conditions for 
new business ventures on the microeconomic patterns of economic develop­
ment. Hoff (1997) and Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) also study social learning 
about the suitability of local conditions for new business ventures, but focus on 
the inefficiency which comes along with the learning externality, rather than 
studying its implications for the microeconomic patterns of growth. Entrepre­
neurship is shown to be underprovided in these papers due to the divergence 
between the private and the social value of gaining experience. Burgess and 
Venables (2004) sketch a framework which suggests that increasing returns to 
scale which are external to individual firms (e.g. thick market externalities)
4 In particular, it is reported that the share of rice, cotton, sugarcane, and soybeans 
in the total area under cultivation exceeded 20 percent in successive time periods. The 
shares of rice, cotton, and sugarcane declined quickly after their respective booms. Soybean 
cultivation, on the contrary, remained successful and is now dominating the local agriculture.
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could be underlying ‘lumpy’ development. Social learning about the suitabil­
ity of local conditions for new business ventures does not play a role in their 
analysis. This social learning, however, seems crucial for understanding the 
above examples of ‘lumpy’ development as well as the observed ‘stuttering’ 
towards a viable business venture.5
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section 
lays out the basic model and establishes the first two results of the chapter. 
A third section then generalizes this basic model and derives both remaining 
results. A fourth section concludes.
2.2 T h e basic m od el
2.2.1 The setup
Consider an economy with two sectors - traditional and modern - which is 
inhabited by L  workers and is endowed with T  units of land. The traditional 
sector uses both land and labour while the modern sector requires labour only. 
Initially, all workers are employed in the traditional sector so that the modern 
sector is not operating. It is uncertain how suitable local conditions are for 
modern sector production and modern sector firms rely on their exogenous ini­
tial beliefs when deciding on whether or not to invest in the modern sector. If 
their priors are optimistic enough so that there is entry into the modern sector, 
some information about the unknown parameter is revealed. In particular, the
5 Caplin and Leahy (1993) also explore the welfare implications of such social learning in 
the context of structural change and again demonstrate that entrepreneurship is underpro­
vided. In a related paper, Caplin and Leahy (1998) show that social learning can potentially 
explain the rapid revitalization of New York’s Lower Sixth Avenue. Hausmann, Hwang, and 
Rodrik (2005) argue that a country’s pattern of specialization is in part determined through 
social learning and provide some evidence that the pattern of specialization is a determinant 
of economic growth.
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outputs of the active modern sector firms are indicative of the suitability of lo­
cal conditions for modern sector production, and this information is then used 
by firms to update their prior beliefs in a Bayesian fashion. Importantly, all 
firms axe assumed to observe these outputs (not only the active modern sector 
firms). Moreover, their priors are assumed to be identical so that the best 
guess about the unknown parameter is always the same among all firms. Also, 
potential costs of entering or leaving the modern sector are ignored. There­
fore, there is no intertemporal trade-off to be solved by the firms when making 
their entry decision. Free entry ensures that, in all time periods, the number 
of modern sector firms is such that expected profits are driven down to zero. 
The equilibrating mechanism is labour market competition. Workers have to 
be attracted from the traditional sector which increases the wage rate. Output 
prices do not play a role here. The economy is supposed to be small relative 
to other economies and trades both modern and traditional sector goods at 
fixed prices.6 For simplicity, a demand side is not explicitly modelled. In 
a small open economy, production decisions are independent of consumption 
decisions, and a particular demand structure only has to be imposed if one 
wants to solve for domestic consumption or the pattern of international trade.
2.2.2 T he m odern  sector
Technology It is assumed that each modern sector firm has a fixed labour 
requirement I. Modern sector firm output is determined by multiplying this 
fixed labour requirement by the productivity parameter <f>, a random variable
6 Another option would be to use product market competition as the equilibrating mech­
anism. This modification would be relatively straightforward and the results of the basic 
model would remain unchanged.
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which can take two values, 0  (high productivity) and 0  (low productivity), 
0 > 0 > 0. The suitability of local conditions for modern sector production 
is captured by p , the probability that productivity is high. This parameter is 
fixed but unknown to the firms. Denoting modern sector firm output by y, 
modern sector technology is thus given by
Vit =  (1 )
where <f)it =  0  with probability p, 0 it =  0  with probability 1 — p and i indexes 
firms and t indexes time. In short, firms can either be successful or not and 
the suitability of local conditions determines average firm success.7
All the risk is assumed to be borne by the modern sector firms in this 
model. At the beginning of the period modern sector firms enter (exit) the 
modern sector and hire (lay off) workers which determines the wage rate. 
Then the productivities are drawn, determining whether a firm makes profits 
or losses.8
Learning Firms have exogenously given prior beliefs about p which they 
update through a process of Bayesian learning. It is assumed that all firms 
can observe the outputs of all modern sector firms so that the history of modern 
sector firm output is common knowledge. Since a modern sector firm’s output 
is either high or low according to whether the productivity draw of the given 
firm in the given time period was good or bad, the number of good productivity 
draws in all draws is also common knowledge. Since all modern sector firms
7Notice that this specification of technology guarantees that y  can only take positive 
values.
8 Of course, one has to assume that modern sector firms own some assets which they can 
use to finance the losses in the bad state. This will be done henceforth.
have access to the same information and use the same updating method, beliefs 
are the same among firms in all time periods.
Priors In particular, suppose that the firms’ beliefs about p are charac­
terized by a beta distribution, p ~  Be  (a, /?), so that9
f(p)  ocpa-1(l - p f ~ l (2)
The beta distribution is a relatively general distribution on the support [0,1]. 
Basically, all reasonably smooth unimodal distributions on this support can 
be approximated by a beta distribution by choosing suitable values for the 
parameters a  and /3. This includes the case of uniform priors (a = (3 =  1) 
which is probably the most intuitive starting point in the case of complete 
ignorance. 10 For future reference, recall that if p  ~  Be(a,/3), then E(p) =
a
a+ /3‘
Updating Consider now the updating of these beliefs. Denote the num­
ber of good draws until period t — 1 by zt~i and the total number of draws by 
fit-1 . If mt is the number of modern sector firms operating in period t  and St 
is the number of high productivity draws in period t, then z t- i  = s\ + ... +  St-i 
and rtt-1 = m i  +  ••• +  77it_i. As discussed above, these two variables can be 
inferred from the output history and constitute the information set available 
to firms at the beginning of period t. By Bayes’ Rule, the posterior beliefs are
9 Recall that the beta distribution has density f (p )  — B(kmV°  1(1 ~ P ) '’ *, where 0 <
p <  1,
10 The proposition that uniform priors should be used in the case of complete ignorance is 
sometimes referred to as Bayes’ postulate.
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given by
i „ „  \ 9 ( z t - i  I P , n t - i ) f ( p )
J \P  I zt—h n t—l )  — / \ (3)
9 \ z t - 1)
where g (.) is a density function which is further defined below. Since zt- 1 is 
just the number of ‘successes’ in a series of n*_i draws, z t- i  follows a binomial 
distribution of index n t- i  and parameter p, z t- i  ~  B  (nt~i,p) so that
g(zt - 1  | = nt-i
Vz t - i \
(4)
Recalhng that /(p) oc pQ X(1 — p)@ 1 it then follows that
f (p  I ocp0***-!-1^  (5)
and hence
P I «t-i, nt_i ~  Be (a +  zt- u /3 +  nt_x -  z t - i) (6 )
These are the updated beliefs at the beginning of period t. They are again 
beta distributed so that the incoming information only changes the parameters 
of the underlying distribution of beliefs but not the distribution itself. 11 This 
implies in particular that
E{p | z t -1,n t- i )  = “ t f - 1 (7)a  +  p +  nt_i
Discussion Modern sector firms are assumed to be risk-neutral so that 
the expected probability of a high modern sector firm productivity will be
11 In other words, the beta distribution is thus conjugate to a binomial likelihood which 
makes it a suitable prior distribution for the purposes of this model. See Lee (1998) for more 
details on this derivation.
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sa key variable in the analysis. Before proceeding with the remainder of the 
model, it is therefore useful to clarify some of the properties of the updating 
of this expectation. For this purpose, the following decomposition is partic­
ularly insightful. It is easy to show that the posterior expectation is just a 
weighted average of the prior expectation and the ‘success rate’, the ratio of 
high productivity draws to total draws,
E(p  | z t - i , th- i ) =  X t - iE (p )  +  (1 -  At- i ) —  (8)nt- 1
where A*_i =  a+$+nt- i '  Notice that A is decreasing in the total number of 
draws which is very intuitive. The success rate is a natural estimatorJ n t - 1
of p and it becomes the more influential relative to the prior belief, the more 
experience has been gained in the modern sector. Several things become ob­
vious from this decomposition. First, it becomes clear that only surprises 
change the firms’ beliefs since E(p \ z t- i ,n t~ i)  ^  E(p) ^  E(p)
•<=>- ^  E(^=^).12 Second, it is revealed that beliefs converge to the truth
as the number of observations increases since l im ^ ^  At_i =  0 and
converges to p as n*_i — > oo. Third, it follows that the current beliefs can al­
ways be calculated by updating the initial beliefs using formula (8 ). The result 
is the same as if the current beliefs are calculated recursively by applying the 
updating rule period by period. To see this define pt =  E(p  | z t- i ,n t~ i)  and 
consider the sequence pi, ...,p*,...,p r • From the above formulae it follows that 
PT = a+^+(m^ . +mT- 1)Pl +  if tlle initial be-
12It is also easy to show that E  (p | =  X t - iE  (p | z t - 2 , n t - 2 ) +  ^1 — At-i^ *' >
where X t- i  =  , which emphasizes this point. Relative to the previous rather than
the initial period, ^  E ( p  \ z t - 2 , n t - 2 ) is a surprise.
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lief is used and p r  = T-l)R  +  0 4 T f c t % £ - , 7
if the period t  belief is used, where cl = a  4 - (si +  ... +  « t-i) and f t  =  
/3 +  (mi +  ... +  mt- 1) — (si + ... +  St-1). Some manipulation reveals that both 
expressions are indeed the same. 13
2.2.3 Traditional sector
The traditional sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive with constant 
returns to scale technology. Apart from labour, it also requires land for pro­
duction (e.g. the agricultural sector). In particular, technology is of the 
Cobb-Douglas type:
x, = { T j f  (L ? y ~ 7  0 )
where x  is traditional sector output, T t  is the land employed in the traditional 
sector, Lt  is the labour employed in the traditional sector, and 0 < 7  < 1. 
Equation (9) gives the aggregate traditional sector output. Firm subscripts 
have been omitted as individual firm size is anyway indeterminate with con­
stant returns to scale technology. Choose units such that the price of the 
traditional sector good is 1 so that the value marginal product of labour in 
the traditional sector is given by (1 —7 ) • As usual, workers are paid
their value marginal product so that the (inverse) labour supply curve faced 
by modern sector firms trying to attract workers from the traditional sector is 
given by
(10)
13 All these are general properties of Bayesian learning. See, for example, Chamley (2004) 
for more on this issue.
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In this equation, w is the wage rate and the factor market clearing conditions 
L = L f  4- L f1 and TfT =  T  have been imposed. Recalling that modern sector 
firms have a fixed labour requirement I so that the number of modern sector 
firms at time t is given by ra* =  - f - ,  the wage rate is given by
wt=(i-7)(dy7 (n)
The wage rate hence increases in all time periods in which firms are entering 
the modern sector. This is, of course, due to fact that the Cobb-Douglas 
technology exhibits diminishing returns to labour.
2.2.4 Equilibrium
If units are again chosen such that the price of the modern sector good is l , 14 
modern sector firm profits in period t  are given by
*it = ~  wtl (1 2 )
From above, recall the notation pt = E(p \ Zt-i,nt~i). At the beginning of 
period t , period t profits are thus expected to be
E(7rit I zt-! ,  nt_i) =  [pf0 +  (1 -  Pt)± -  Wt] I (13)
As discussed previously, free entry drives E (tth | z t- i ,n t~ i)  down to zero. 
Firms are not willing to invest in period t unless they expect to make profits
14 Recall that the economy is assumed to be small relative to other economies and trades 
both modern and traditional sector goods at fixed prices. Therefore, it is possible to choose 
units in both sectors which set goods prices equal to 1.
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in period t. They never invest just to learn something about the suitability of 
local conditions since the private value of this information is zero. If there is a 
good surprise and local conditions turn out to be very favourable for modern 
sector production, this becomes common knowledge and triggers entry in the 
following period. Using the wage rate from equation (11), the equilibrium 
number of modern sector firms at time t  can thus be computed from setting 
(13) equal to zero,
m t = k  —   j- (14)
[pt<f>+(l-pt)£~'
where the parameters k =  j  and p =  j ( l  —7 )^ have been introduced to 
simplify the notation . 15 Since (j> > <f>, the equilibrium number of firms is thus 
increasing in p*. The better local conditions are believed to be, the more 
modern sector firms are operating. Together with equation (7), this equation 
yields
mt = k ------------------   y  (15)
=  K------------------------- ------------------- y-
Hence, the number of firms in period t  depends on the number of firms in 
previous periods and the history of productivity draws. The industrialization 
path is random, since changes in beliefs are driven by the random productivity 
draws. Notice also that, for a given history, the number of firms is increasing 
in a  and decreasing in p. This is because an increase in a (ft) makes beliefs
15 Of course, the equilibrium number of modern sector firms cannot be negative. So if
k < — - — 2---- j-, mt — 0 .
[pt#+(i—pt)^ \
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more skewed to the left (to the right) so that local conditions are believed to 
be more (less) suitable for modern sector production.
To make the model interesting, assume that
This assumption ensures that the modern sector firms’ entry decisions are not
so high that it would not be profitable to enter the modern sector even if the 
good state occurred with certainty. With this condition, there hence exists an 
expected success probability p such that the modern sector is operating if and 
only if beliefs are more optimistic than p. From equation (14) it follows that 
this threshold belief is given by16
It is easy to show that p is decreasing in both productivities given that the 
above parameter restriction is satisfied. This is not surprising since higher 
productivities make modern sector production more attractive regardless of 
the suitability of local conditions.
This completes the derivation of the basic model. The next section now 
turns to analysing its implications for industrial growth and development.
16Notice that <£ <  (^ )7 <  <j> <=$■ 0 <  p  <  1.
(16)
independent of their beliefs. If ( ^ ) 7  < <f>, the initial wage rate would be so low 
that it would be profitable to enter the modern sector even if the bad state
occurred with certainty. Similarly, if (f) < (£)7, the initial wage rate would be
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2.2.5 Analysis
This analysis of the basic model establishes the first two results of the chap­
ter. In a first part, it is shown that sufficient business confidence is crucial for 
fostering economic growth. The discussion in that part also serves to charac­
terize more generally the development patterns which are consistent with the 
model. In a second part, it is then demonstrated how social learning about the 
suitability of local conditions for new business ventures can lead to ‘lumpy’ 
economic development.
Business confidence and the patterns o f modern sector development
In this model, business confidence is captured by the firms’ initial beliefs about 
the suitability of local conditions for modern sector production. Three main 
points need to be made to characterize how these beliefs shape the microeco­
nomic patterns of growth:
1. If initial beliefs are sufficiently pessimistic, there will never be any mod­
ern sector production regardless of how suitable local conditions are in 
reality. If p\ < p, no firm finds it profitable to invest in the modern sec­
tor in the first time period. But without modern sector activity, there 
is no learning and hence no investment in future time periods. No firm 
has an incentive to incur an expected loss in one period in order to learn 
something about the suitability of local conditions for modern sector pro­
duction, since this information has no private value in the given context 
of social learning.
2. If local conditions are not suitable for modern sector production, p < P i 
modern sector production will always be given up at some point in time.
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If local conditions are suitable for modern sector production, p > P, 
and modern sector production is not given up, the number of firms will 
converge to the full information equilibrium
This is due to the convergence property of Bayesian learning which was 
discussed in section (2.2.2). If the modern sector does not stop operating,
as experience is gained in the modern sector. If p < p and p\ > p so that 
there is some modern sector activity initially although local conditions 
are not suitable for modern sector production, beliefs will therefore hit 
p at some point in time with probability 1. From then on, the modern 
sector will stop operating and beliefs will remain unchanged since no new 
information becomes available. Similarly, if p >  p and p\ > p so that 
there is some modern sector activity initially and local conditions are 
suitable for modern sector production, beliefs will converge to the truth 
provided that modern sector production is not given up. As pt — ► p, 
rrit — ► m FI from equation (14).
3. Even if there is some modern sector activity initially and local conditions 
are suitable for modern sector production, p > p and p\ >  p, modern 
sector production will be given up with a positive probability. This is 
because p is only the expected value of the success rate ^  which is 
distributed over [0,1]. Sufficient bad luck will lead to a series of bad 
surprises ^  < Pt which will drag down beliefs to the threshold level p.
P (18)
nt_i — ► oo as t — ► oo so that pt — ► p. Beliefs converge to the truth
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The more suitable local conditions are for modern sector production (the 
higher p) and the more optimistic initial beliefs are (the higher pi), the 
less likely it is that a viable modern sector is given up. The higher p, the 
less likely it is to get a sufficient number of success rates < p which 
are necessary to make beliefs reach p if pi > p as is obvious from the 
updating formula. Also, the higher p \ , the more success rates ^  < p  are 
required to make beliefs reach p if p\ > p as the incoming information is 
always weighted with p\.
As an illustration, the case of a viable modern sector and too pessimistic 
initial beliefs is drawn in figure (1). The two dotted lines illustrate that if the 
priors axe such that there will be some initial activity in the modern sector, 
beliefs either converge to the tru th  or to the threshold level. This corresponds 
to the number of firms converging to the full information equilibrium or to 
modern sector production being given up. The dashed line illustrates that 
if priors are such that there is no initial investment, then beliefs will stay 
unchanged since no experience is gained.
In summary, if firms have overly pessimistic initial beliefs, viable business 
ventures remain unattempted, whereas overly optimistic beliefs never make 
firms pursue non-viable ventures permanently. However, even if initial beliefs 
are sufficiently optimistic, viable ventures may be abandoned if firms misin­
terpret the evidence available to them.
‘Lum piness’ of m odern  sec to r developm ent In their analysis of ‘lumpy’ 
economic development, Burgess and Venables (2004) suggest to divide the 
determinants of microeconomic growth into ‘1st advantages’ and ‘2 nd advan-
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Figure 1: Business confidence and the microeconomic patterns of growth
tages’. In their framework, ‘1st advantages’ capture the prerequisites of growth 
such as good policies, institutions, and infrastructure, while ‘2 nd advantages’ 
cover the self-reinforcing aspects of growth which boost modern sector devel­
opment once it has started. As indicated earlier, increasing returns to scale 
which are external to the firm (e.g. thick market externalities) axe thought to 
be underlying these ‘2 nd advantages’ in their analysis.
Although thick markets do not play a role here, it is nevertheless insightful 
to apply this conceptual framework to the present analysis. Here, ‘1st advan­
tages’ are captured by the two productivity parameters which get larger as the 
economic environment improves. Once the environment is favourable enough 
to induce some modern sector investment, the evolution of beliefs becomes 
important for the pattern of development. Due to the learning dynamics, this 
development pattern can - though need not - be self-reinforcing so that social 
learning can be seen as a potential source of ‘2nd advantage’. To see this, con­
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sider an initial situation where beliefs are such that no firm has an incentive 
to invest in the modern sector. As ‘1st advantages’ improve, 0 and <f> increase 
so that p decreases. If the productivities increase sufficiently, p will at some 
point become lower than p\ so that some firms enter the modern sector. Now 
the process of learning begins. Since beliefs only become more optimistic as a 
consequence of good surprises, the modern sector will only continue to grow 
if the productivity draws are surprisingly good, - ^  > Pt- This can happen 
either by chance or because local conditions are truly surprisingly suitable for 
modern sector production, p > p\. If it happens by chance and local condi­
tions are in reality not very well suited for modern sector production, modern 
sector development will take an inverted u-shape since eventually beliefs must 
converge to the truth. If, however, local conditions are indeed surprisingly 
favourable, learning can lead to longer lasting, rapid growth until the full 
information equilibrium is attained. It is this adjustment of expectations fol­
lowing overly pessimistic initial beliefs that can bring about ‘lumpy’ modern 
sector development in this model.
This is illustrated in figure (2 ). Suppose that at time t* ‘1st advantages’ are 
such that some investment in the modern sector occurs. If local conditions are 
in reality not suitable for modern sector production so that the full information 
equilibrium number of firms is zero, then good surprises can only occur by 
chance which can give rise to an inverted u-shaped development pattern as 
depicted by the dashed line. If, however, the full information equilibrium 
number of firms is positive, good surprises do not come by accident and can 
give rise to rapid modern sector development as shown by the dotted line. 
Then learning about the suitability of local conditions has a ‘2nd advantage’
character since growth is then self-reinforcing.
Notice that this discussion also implies that improvements in the economic 
environment may map discontinuously into microeconomic growth. As long 
as increases in the productivity parameters are not sufficient to trigger entry 
into the modern sector, the improvement in the economic environment does 
not have any effects. But if the economic environment becomes sufficiently 
good so that some firms invest in the modern sector, the modern sector may 
take-off suddenly so that small changes in the institutional environment may 
trigger rapid economic development.
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Figure 2: Sudden and rapid modern sector development
2.3 M u ltip le  m od ern  sectors or m u ltip le  regions
Consider now a simple extension of the basic model allowing for multiple 
sectors. This extension delivers the two main additional results. First, it 
is established that development may involve a wave-like pattern of growth
where successive business ventures are first pursued and then given up until 
a venture is found for which local conditions are suitable. Second, it is shown 
that, despite this potential ‘stuttering’ towards a viable venture, there is no 
guarantee that firms pursue the best venture even in the long-run.
Suppose thus that there are r  modern sectors indexed by j  or k and assume 
that local conditions suit different modern sectors differently so that p 7 ^  pfc, 
j  7  ^ k , for all j , k =  1,2, ...,r. Only a few changes to the basic model are 
required to allow for this generalization. Modern sector technologies are now 
given by
Vit = <titl (19)
where (jPit = (f> with probability p7, (j)3it = <f> with probability 1 — p 7 , and (f>> <f>. 
Crucially, the parameter p now has an index j  to denote that local conditions 
suit different modern sectors differently. At the beginning of period t, period 
t modern sector firm profits in sector j  are thus expected to be17
E (*it I zt - v  nt - 1) =  +  (1  “  Pt)± ~  *4] 1 (2°)
Therefore, the maximum wage a firm of modern sector j  can pay in period t 
and expect non-negative profits is given by
wj = p j ? + ( 1 - p j ) 0  (21)
The discussion of this extended model is again summarized in three remarks. 
Remark 1 clarifies an important property of the extended model while remarks
17 The output prices are again normalized to 1 for simplicity.
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2 and 3 establish the main additional results:
1. At any given point in time, only one modern sector will operate. Prom 
equation (2 1 ) it is obvious that w l is increasing in pPt . Since break even 
wages must be paid in equilibrium due to the free entry assumption, 
firms in the modern sector which is believed to perform best tinder the 
given local conditions are thus paying the highest wages. Firms of any 
other modern sector will not be able to afford these high wages and will 
not be operating. Notice that such extreme specialization even evolves 
if beliefs are uniform initially since one good surprise from one modern 
sector suffices to make firms ‘rush’ into that sector.
2 . Although only one modern sector will operate at any given point in time, 
it need not always be the same one. As a given modern sector is active, 
information about the suitability of local conditions for this particular 
modern sector is revealed which changes the firms’ beliefs about that 
sector. At the same time, beliefs about all other sectors are unaffected. 
A series of bad surprises, ^  < Pt can drag down to the level of 
the modern sector which was initially believed to be second best. Then 
this modern sector starts operating and information about it becomes 
available. If there are good surprises, it will continue to be active. If 
there are bad surprises, production in the initial modern sector will be 
resumed. Notice that a given sector k  can only be operating in the long- 
run if p k >  jPt for all j  7  ^ k since beliefs converge to the truth eventually. 
The true  suitability of local conditions for a given modern sector must 
hence be better than the expected suitability of local conditions for all
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other modern sectors.
The potential ‘stuttering’ towards a viable business venture follows as a 
corollary from this result. To see this most clearly, consider the extreme 
case where firms wrongly believe all sectors to be viable initially, p [ > p  
for all j , although local conditions are only suitable for modern sector 
k, pi < p  for all j  ^  k and pk > p. Then, of course, firms will eventually 
give up all sectors they attempt until they reach sector k , indeed giving 
rise to a wave-like pattern of economic development. 18
3. Production will not necessarily move to the best modern sector as time 
passes by and knowledge accumulates. From remark 1 we know that the 
modern sector which is believed to be best will be operating, in general, 
not the modern sector which is best in reality. From remark 2 we know 
that a modern sector can only be active over a long period of time if 
the true suitability of local conditions for that sector is better than the 
expected suitability of local conditions for all other modern sectors. This 
implies that the suitability of local conditions for the best sector must 
hence be underestimated to allow for a less productive modern sector to 
be operating in the long run.
Of course, the remarks from the basic model also apply with suitable mod­
ifications: 1 ) if initial beliefs are sufficiently pessimistic, no modern sector will 
develop; 2 ) if production is not viable in any of the modern sectors, it will be 
given up with probability 1. If one modern sector keeps operating for a long 
time, the equilibrium number of firms in that sector will converge to the re­
18A s was clarified by remark 3 of the previous section, the firms may, of course, also give 
up the viable sector k by mistake.
spective full information value; 3) even if local conditions are suitable for some 
sectors and one of these modern sectors is active, modern sector production 
will be given up with a positive probability.
Notice that the same extension could also be interpreted as being the 
case of multiple regions which offer different suitabilities for modern sector 
production and share a common labour market. The predictions would, of 
course, be analogous: 1 ) only one region is operating a modern sector at any 
given point in time; 2 ) nevertheless, different regions can operate a modern 
sector at different points in time; 3) the modern sector will not necessarily 
move to the best region as time passes by.
2.4  C onclusion
In this chapter, I presented a model of social learning about the suitability 
of local conditions for new business ventures and explored its implications for 
the microeconomic patterns of growth. The analysis delivered four main re­
sults. First, firms tend to invest in business ventures with which other firms 
have had surprising success, thus causing development to be ‘lumpy’. One 
consequence of this ‘lumpiness’ is that improvements in the economic envi­
ronment (policies, institutions, infrastructure, etc.) may map discontinuously 
into microeconomic growth. Second, sufficient business confidence is crucial for 
fostering economic growth and development. If firms have overly pessimistic 
initial beliefs, viable business ventures remain unattempted, whereas overly 
optimistic beliefs never make firms pursue non-viable ventures permanently. 
However, even if initial beliefs are sufficiently optimistic, viable ventures may 
be abandoned if firms misinterpret the evidence available to them. Third,
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development may involve a wave-like pattern of growth where successive busi­
ness ventures are first pursued and then given up until a venture is found for 
which local conditions are sufficiently suitable. Finally, despite this potential 
‘stuttering’ towards a viable venture, there is no guarantee that firms pursue 
the best venture even in the long-run.
Although the role of technology transfers was stressed in the motivation 
of this chapter, the mechanisms which were highlighted here are probably at 
work in many other settings. Firms can learn from the experiences of other 
firms whenever there is non-idiosyncratic uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty con­
cerning factors which affect all firms alike. Such social learning can then lead 
to ‘lumpy’ and ‘stuttering’ economic growth unless those uncertain business 
ventures are patentable.
Regarding future research, more formal econometric work on the impor­
tance of such learning externalities now seems to be most urgently needed. I 
believe that this chapter can be a useful starting point for such research since 
it delivers some observable (and potentially testable) predictions for the mi­
croeconomic patterns of growth. 19 The main challenge, of course, is to disen­
tangle social learning from other determinants of the microeconomic patterns 
of growth.
19Hausman and Rodrik (2003, pp. 613-614), for example, argue that it is hard to test the 
predictions of their model since “much of our story has to do with outcomes that are not 
observed: the failure to develop non-traditional activities because of inadequate incentives 
to invest in learning what one is good at producing”.
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3 Trade Liberalization, Outsourcing, and Firm Pro­
ductivity
3.1 In trod u ction
Evaluating the gains from trade liberalization has always been a key concern 
of international economics. Recently, many empirical studies have focused on 
the productivity effects of trade liberalization (e.g. Pavcnik 2002, Topalova 
2004, Trefler 2004).20 Their results suggest that there are important trade- 
induced improvements in overall productivity, either through gains in average 
firm productivity (‘firm productivity effect’) or through the reallocation of 
market share from less to more productive firms (‘reallocation effect’).
While the recent theoretical literature has mainly concentrated on un­
derstanding the reallocation effect (e.g. Melitz 2003, Bernard et al. 2003, 
Melitz and Ottaviano 2005), my focus is on the firm productivity effect. In 
the context of a simple general equilibrium model of trade, I show that trade 
liberalization leads to outsourcing as firms focus on their core competencies in 
response to tougher competition. Since firms are better at performing tasks 
the closer they are to their core competencies, this outsourcing then increases 
firm productivity. Besides establishing this result, I also investigate the links 
between various technological parameters and outsourcing. In particular, I 
analyse how technological progress, changes in fixed costs, and changes in 
internal governance costs affect firms’ integration decisions.
To the best of my knowledge, this chapter is the first attempt to theoret­
ically link trade-induced gains in firm and industry productivity to a vertical
20 See Tybout (2002) for a survey of the earlier literature.
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focusing on core competencies. Other papers have mainly emphasized increas­
ing returns to scale (e.g. Krugman 1979), learning by exporting (e.g. Clerides, 
Lach, and Tybout 1998), competition-induced innovation (e.g. Aghion et al. 
2005), or a horizontal focusing on core competencies by multi-product firms 
(e.g. Eckel and Neary, 2005; Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2006; Nocke 
and Yeaple, 2006) as potential sources of the firm productivity effect. Only 
McLaren (2000) also studies the productivity gains of trade-induced vertical 
disintegration. Both the source of the productivity gains as well as the link 
between trade-liberalization and outsourcing are very different in his model, 
however.
Apart from proposing a new mechanism which helps understanding trade- 
induced increases in firm productivity, this chapter is also interesting from a 
modelling perspective. In particular, I solve for the range of vertically related 
production tasks performed within the boundaries of each firm, thus allowing 
me to study continuous changes in the degree of vertical integration. Previous 
work has usually considered two discreet ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ pro­
duction facilities, which could either merge into a fully integrated firm or stay 
entirely disintegrated (e.g. Grossman and Helpman 2002).
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 sets up 
the model and introduces the concepts ‘value chain’ and ‘core competencies’. 
Section 3.3 derives the outsourcing decisions of firms, while section 3.4 solves 
for the general equilibrium. Section 3.5 is concerned with the comparative 
statics, establishing the key results. A final section concludes.
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3.2 T h e  basic setu p
The model is a generalization of Krugman’s (1979) monopolistic competition 
model of trade, the key difference being that the production process of a given 
variety is now divided between vertically related firms. The basic setup of 
Krugman (1979) is chosen because it features a competition effect generating 
a reduction in mark-ups following trade liberalization. As will become clear, 
this reduction in mark-ups is necessary for trade liberalization to affect vertical 
integration in this model.
3.2.1 Demand
Consider thus an economy producing and consuming i =  1, ...,ny final goods, 
where ny is endogenous. There are L consumers who are endowed with one 
unit of labour each. Consumers have ‘love of variety’-preferences
71 y
U = ^  v (xi) , vr (X{) > 0, v" (Xi) <  0 (2 2 )
i=i
where v(xi) is the utility derived from consuming x  units of final good i. They 
maximize this utility subject to their budget constraint
ny
u  = Y^PiXi (23)
i —1
where u  is the wage rate and pi is the price paid for good i. As can be seen 
from the first order condition of the consumer’s maximization problem, the 
resulting demand has elasticity
To introduce a competition effect into the model, assume that e'(xi) < 0. As 
is easy to verify, this is equivalent to assuming that demand is less convex than 
in the constant elasticity case (e.g. linear). Assume also that e(oo) > 1 and 
e(0 ) > 7  a positive and constant cost parameter to be defined below. As
will be discussed later, these parameter restrictions are necessary to guarantee 
the existence of a monopolistic competition equilibrium.
3.2.2 Value chain
Consider now the production process of the final goods. The production of 
each of these goods requires the sequential performance of a number of tasks. 
Early tasks are concerned with obtaining raw materials which are then refined 
successively in later production stages. The set of these tasks is represented 
by a line of length v which I call the value chain. To produce the final good, all 
tasks z  6 [0, I*] have to be performed sequentially. If only tasks z 6 [0, wi], 0 < 
w\ < v, are performed, a preliminary good w\ is obtained. This preliminary 
good w\ can then be transformed into a more downstream preliminary good 
W2 , 0  < w\ < W2 < v, by performing the additional tasks z € [wi,W2 \ and so 
on. One unit of each task is required to produce one unit of the final good. 
Similarly, one unit of the relevant subset of tasks is required to produce one 
unit of a preliminary good. The value chains of all final goods are assumed 
to be independent of each other. The preliminary goods are always specific 
to the production process of a particular final good and are of no use outside 
their value chains.21
21A similar representation of the production process has been used by Dixit and Grossman 
(1982).
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3.2.3 Final good producers vs. preliminary good producers
There are a large number of potential firms whose role is to perform these 
production tasks. Each of these firms owns the trademark rights of a different 
final good, giving the firm the exclusive right to perform the final task v in the 
value chain of this final good.22 All other tasks 2  G [0, v) can be performed 
by all firms without restrictions. Firms can choose between producing their 
own final product (i.e. becoming final good producers) or performing tasks 
outsourced by other firms (i.e. becoming preliminary good producers). As final 
good producers, they transform a preliminary good into the final good they 
own the trademark rights to. As preliminary good producers, they transform 
a preliminary good into a more downstream one. As will become clear, free 
entry drives profits down to zero for both types of producers, so that firms are 
indifferent between both options in equilibrium.
3.2.4 Costs and core com petencies
Firms are symmetric in all other aspects of the production technology. To 
start operating, they have to incur a fixed cost /  which is measured in terms 
of labour. This fixed cost is associated with acquiring a core competency k in 
a value chain. The role of this core competency is reflected in the structure of 
variable costs. The labour requirement of performing one unit of each task in 
the range [wi, w2] in this value chain is given by
1 rw  2
l(w i,w 2) = -  c { \ k - z \ ) d z  (25)
" Jw\
22 This final task can be thought of as turning a relatively generic product into a particular 
brand.
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where d  (.) > 0 , so that firms get the worse at performing a given task the 
further away it is from their core competency.23 Firms can only acquire one 
core competency so that a core competency is the defining feature of a firm. 
Firms can choose, however, which core competency to acquire and which value 
chain to invest in.
3.2.5 O utsourcing  co n trac ts  and  th e  vertical division of labour
The vertical division of labour in each value chain is determined in the fol­
lowing bargaining game. There are two stages, a contracting stage and a 
production stage, and both stages are divided into a sequence of substages.
C o n trac ting  stage  Consider first the contracting stage. In the first sub­
stage, the final good producer enters, chooses a core competency, and incurs 
the associated fixed costs. Then she decides whether to perform all tasks 
z 6  [0 , v] required to produce the final good in-house, or to tender a take-it- 
or-leave-it outsourcing contract, offering to purchase yUa units of preliminary 
good wns at price pns, where yUa, wna, and pUa are choice variables.24 If she 
decides to perform all tasks in-house, the contracting stage ends. If she de­
cides to tender an outsourcing contract and this outsourcing contract is not 
accepted by any firm, she either performs all tasks in-house or exits. If, on the 
other- hand, she decides to tender an outsourcing contract and this outsourc­
ing contract is signed by a preliminary good producer, the second substage 
begins. This second substage is essentially a repetition of the first substage.
23Notice that this is the labour requirement of transforming one unit of preliminary good 
w\  into one unit of preliminary good W2 .
24Notice that she can do so because she has the exclusive right to perform the final task 
v,  and preliminary goods are specific to the production process of a particular final good.
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First, the preliminary good producer enters, chooses a core competency, and 
incurs the associated fixed costs. Then she decides whether to perform all 
tasks z 6  [0 , wUa] required to produce preliminary good wUg in-house, or to 
tender another take-it-or-leave-it outsourcing contract, offering to purchase 
yn3- i  units of the more upstream preliminary good wna- \  at price pna- 1> 
where yne- i ,  WnB- 1 , and pna- i  are again choice variables. If she decides to 
perform all tasks in-house, the contracting stage ends. If she decides to tender 
an outsourcing contract and this outsourcing contract is not accepted by any 
firm, she is forced to produce the agreed upon quantity of preliminary good 
wna in-house. If, on the other hand, she decides to tender an outsourcing 
contract and this outsourcing contract is signed by another preliminary good 
producer, the third substage begins. This process continues until in some 
substage a preliminary good producer decides to perform all remaining tasks 
in-house. In all substages, contracts are assumed to be complete and perfectly 
enforceable. Also, there is free entry of potential firms, so that outsourcing 
offers are going to be accepted as long as they imply non-negative profits.
P ro d u c tio n  stage  Consider now the production stage which follows after 
the contracting stage ends. The production stage is simply the execution of 
the production process as agreed upon in the contracting stage, taking into 
account the sequentiality of the production process. Hence, the most upstream 
preliminary good producer produces the agreed upon quantity of the agreed 
upon preliminary product by sequentially performing the required tasks and 
sells it to the second most upstream preliminary good producer at the agreed 
upon price and so on until all tasks have been performed and the final good
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is produced.
3.3 O ptim al organ ization  o f  produ ction
As will turn out, this game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
In this equilibrium, the final good producer chooses her actions to maximize 
her profits subject to the actions she can expect to be chosen by the prelimi­
nary good producers after eliminating non-credible threats. As always, profit 
maximization implies cost minimization, and it is useful to consider both in 
turn. The solution to the cost minimization problem will be derived in the 
following subsection. The solution to the profit maximization problem will be 
discussed thereafter.
3.3.1 C ost m in im ization
To solve the cost minimization problem, I proceed in two steps. First, I take 
a social planner’s perspective and derive the division of labour between firms 
which ensures that total production costs of the final good are minimized for 
a given level of output. Then, I turn to the decentralized case. As will become 
clear later, the decentralized equilibrium is easy to characterize in view of the 
solution to the social planner’s problem, given the strong bargaining position 
of the final good producer in the bargaining game.
F irs t step : solving th e  social p lan n er’s p rob lem  Consider thus a so­
cial planner who is in full control of the final good producer and all potential 
preliminary good producers. How many firms should participate in the pro­
duction process of the final good, which core competencies should they acquire, 
and which tasks should each firm perform in order to minimize the total cost of
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producing y units of the final good? This problem will be solved in a number 
of steps.
Consider first an arbitrary number of firms with an arbitrary distribution 
of core competencies. To minimize total production costs, which firm should 
perform which set of tasks? Since the fixed costs have to be incurred irrespec­
tive of the organization of production, they are irrelevant for the solution to 
this problem. For total cost minimization, the aim should thus be to minimize 
the total unit labour requirement. Consider figure (3) which plots \ c  (|fc — z\) 
for an arbitrary number of firms and an arbitrary distribution of core compe­
tencies.25 In this figure, the total unit labour requirement is represented by 
the total area under all triangles. As can be easily seen, this area is minimized 
if each firm performs the task which exactly matches its core competency plus 
all the tasks to both sides of this core competency until half-way between this 
firm’s core competency and the neighbouring firm’s core competency.
Consider now the optimal distribution of core competencies. Elemen­
tary geometry reveals that the total area under all triangles is minimized if 
the firms’ core competencies are distributed uniformly along the value chain. 
Hence, for total cost minimization each firm should be of the same vertical 
size and perform a symmetric range of tasks around its core competency.
Finally, consider the optimal vertical firm size conditional on a given level 
of output s(y). Since all tasks z G [0 , v] have to be performed to produce 
the final product, this is equivalent to considering the optimal number of 
firms in this value chain conditional on a given level of output ns (y), where
25 To keep the illustration simple, c ( .)  is drawn as a linear function with c(0) = 0  in this 
figure. All results carry over to the more general case, however.
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ns (y ) — ^ y .26 For given vertical and horizontal firm sizes s and y, each firm 
has a labour requirement of
/ =  /  + 'i: c (z) dz (26)
as can be inferred easily from equation (25) and figure (3) . 27 Defining C ( | )  =  
Jq c (z) dz this can be written as
i = /  + y c ( f ) (27)
Notice that C'(.) =  c(.) from the above definition of C  (.). Since there are 
^ firms involved in the production of the given final good, the total labour 
requirement is given by ^1. Since labour is paid a wage rate u>, total production 
costs are
CJV „ CUV ~ / S \
TC = V f + V y0(-2) (28)
Minimizing this expression with respect to s yields the first order condition
f  = y (29)
which implicitly defines s (y).28 It is straightforward to show that this implies29
s’ (y) < 0 (30)
26 v  is assumed to be sufficiently large relative to s (y) so that the integer problem can be 
ignored.
27Notice that the above result that firms should be of the same vertical size and perform a 
symmetric range of tasks around their core competencies is incorporated in this expression.
2 8 It can be easily checked that the second order condition for cost minimization is also 
satisfied.
29From equation (29) it follows that s' (y) =  — which is negative since c1 ( | )  > 0 .
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Hence, vertical and horizontal firm size are negatively related if total pro­
duction costs are to be minimized. Underlying this result is a trade-off be­
tween fixed and variable total production costs. If output is large, variable 
costs become more important relative to fixed costs so that it is efficient to 
incur additional fixed costs and set up more firms which can then operate at 
a smaller vertical scale in order to achieve lower variable production costs. 
Given the optimal firm size s (y), the optimal labour requirement of each firm 
I (y ) then follows straightforwardly from equation (27).
In summary, total production costs are thus minimized if each task is 
performed by only one firm, all firms are of size s (y) and perform a symmetric 
range of tasks around their core competencies.
Tasks performed by firm 4
zV
Figure 3: Vertical equilibrium
Second step : solving for th e  decen tralized  equilibrium  Given the 
strong bargaining position of the final good producer in the bargaining game, 
the decentralized equilibrium is easy to characterize in view of this solution to
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the social planner’s problem. In fact, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
of the bargaining game exactly replicates the solution to the social planner’s 
problem in terms of the number of vertically related firms, the location of their 
core competencies, and the range and quantity of tasks they perform. As for 
the equilibrium outsourcing contracts, they are such that all preliminary good 
producers make zero profits. In terms of the above notation, the final good 
producer thus performs y units of the final s (y) tasks in-house and buys y units 
of preliminary product v — s(y)  at price lj [ns (y) — 1] I (y) from a preliminary 
good producer. This preliminary good producer purchases y units of prelimi­
nary product v — 2s (y) at price u  [ns (y) — 2] I (y) from yet another preliminary 
good producer and so on. Finally, the second most upstream firm in the value 
chain purchases y units of preliminary product v — [ns (y) — 1] s (y) = s (y) 
at price u  [n8 (y) — (ns (y ) — 1 )] I (y) = ul  (y) from the most upstream firm. 
To verify that this is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the bargaining 
game, proceed by backwards induction. Consider first the production stage. 
Given the assumption that contracts are complete and perfectly enforceable, 
firms cannot deviate in the production stage. Consider now the contract­
ing stage. Notice first that in all substages no preliminary good producer 
has an incentive to deviate in any action since only the described actions are 
consistent with zero profits (in otlier words, the preliminary good producers’ 
participation constraints are binding). Notice second that the final good pro­
ducer does not have an incentive to deviate since the described actions allow 
her to produce y units of the final good at minimum possible costs. Hence, 
this is indeed a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the bargaining game. 
Clearly, it is also the only one.
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Since all firms are assumed to be able to become final good producers 
for some final good, the above argument only goes through if the final good 
producer also makes zero profits in equilibrium. This will be ensured through 
monopolistic product market competition as will be laid out in a later section.
3.3.2 Profit maxim ization
Consider now the profit maximization problem of the final good producer. 
Given the equilibrium outsourcing contract, the final good producer’s total 
cost function is given by
T C  (y) = i vvyc  (31)
This is just the expression for the minimum possible total production cost as 
follows from equations (28) and (29). Some manipulation reveals that the final 
good producer’s marginal costs are given by
M C ( y ) = ^ v r c i ^ )  (32)
Consider now the demand facing the final good producer. In a setting of 
monopolistic competition, the demand elasticity perceived by the final good 
producer is exactly as derived above from consumer choice (see equation (24)). 
As is well known, profit maximization implies that firms charge a mark-up 
m  (x) over marginal costs, where
Notice that m! (x ) > 0 since e' (x) < 0 and that m (0) <  7  since e(0) > 
Of course, y = Lx  so that
P (34)
This is one of the central equations of the analysis. It describes the pairs J  
and y consistent with profit maximization (for this reason, the relationship 
will be referred to as P M X  curve henceforth).
3.4  T h e zero profit equilibrium
3.4.1 The zero profit condition
The model is closed with a zero profit condition. As long as final good pro­
ducers make positive profits, new varieties will be established increasing the 
competition facing each final good producer.30 Final good producers’ average 
costs are given by
as follows straightforwardly from equation (31). The zero profit condition can 
thus be written as
ucts. Basically, the price offered for each intermediate good would have to be increased until 
firms are indifferent between becoming a final good producer or a supplier of a preliminary 
good. The conclusions regarding the zero profit equilibrium are, of course, unaffected by this 
consideration.
UJVC (35)
(36)
This is the second central equation of the analysis. It describes the combina­
tions of £ and y where final good producers make zero profits (for this reason,
30 As indicated above, if final good producers make positive profits the optimal outsourcing 
contract needs to be altered to induce some firms to become suppliers of preliminary prod-
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the relationship will be referred to as Z P C  curve henceforth).
3.4.2 The ZPC curve as an indicator of labour productivity
Notice that the Z P C  curve also captures inverse labour productivity. To see 
this, recall that each firm in the value chain contributes an equal number of 
tasks to the production of the final product. Hence, units of output can 
be attributed to the work of a single firm and labour productivity is simply 
given by ■— • Now remember that the Z P C  curve is defined as AC^  • 
From equation (28) it follows that
This observation will be useful later on in the analysis.
3.4.3 Existence, stability and uniqueness
The P M X  curve and the Z P C  curve are two equations in the two unknowns 
^ and y. For an equilibrium to exist, the P M X  curve and the Z P C  curve 
must intersect. For an equilibrium to be stable, the Z P C  curve must intersect 
the P M X  curve from above, as depicted in figure (4). Then entry of final good 
producers will shift the demand curve to the left whenever y is to the right of 
the intersection and exit of final good producers will shift the demand curve 
to the right whenever y is to the left of the intersection. For an equilibrium
(37)
which, together with equation (27), implies that
AC  (y) _  ns (y) I (y) (38)
y
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to be unique, the Z P C  curve must only intersect the P M X  curve once.
Some more structure needs to be imposed on the model to ensure that 
an equilibrium exists, is stable and unique. A particularly useful restriction 
sufficient to guarantee existence, stability and uniqueness is to impose
£ f f i s ( 1  +  7) £ f f i  (39)
I  s
As can be seen from equations (32) and (35), this restriction ensures that 
average and marginal costs are proportional, the factor of proportionality being 
(1 +  7),
AC  =  ( 1  +  7 ) M C  (40)
Since s' (y) <  0 and d  ( | )  > 0, average costs are decreasing in y. It is easy to 
show that marginal costs are also decreasing in y .31 Of course, the marginal 
cost curve must be strictly below the average cost curve in that case, m  (0 ) < 7  
implies that the P M X  curve will be strictly below the Z P C  curve at y =  0.
Since m! (y) > 0, the P M X  curve will fall less than proportionately relative to
the marginal cost curve as y increases.32 If marginal costs and average costs 
are proportional, this implies that ZP C  intersects P M X  only once and from 
above.
Notice that the above restriction is equivalent to imposing
c(.) = \ ( . ) \  A >  0, 7 >  0 (41)
k ( { ) - C ( } ) ]  =  = $ * 4  <  0 since s' ( y )  <  0.
32In fact, if the mark-up increases in output at a sufficient speed, the P M X  curve might 
even become upward sloping.
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Since (39) is an identity it can be differentiated so that
‘'(IH(IMf) (-)
where a ( | )  =  - r^y. This is a simple linear first-order differential equation with 
general solution
< « >
Since d  (.) > 0 was required, A > 0, 7  > 0. This restriction will be imposed 
henceforth.
Low demand: exit High demand: entry
p/w
PMX
ZPC
-ve profits +ve profits
Figure 4: Horizontal equilibrium 
3.4.4 Solving for th e  general equilibrium
The equilibrium values (£)* and y* are thus determined by Z P C  and P M X . 
The equilibrium vertical firm size s* then follows from (29), equilibrium con­
sumption per worker is given by x* = y*/L. Equilibrium employment per firm 
I* is determined by (27), the equilibrium number of firms per value chain can 
be calculated from n* =  v/s*. Given the symmetry of the preference struc­
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ture, X{ = x  and Pi = p  for all i in equilibrium, so that the consumers’ budget 
constraints simplify to nypx =  w. This equation then determines the number 
of goods n*. Finally, the total number of firms is given by n* =n*n*.
3.4.5 In tro d u c tio n  o f com parative  s ta tics
With this framework at hand, one can analyse the effect of the exogenous 
variables L ,v , f ,  X and 7  on the endogenous variables p/oj, s, y, x, I, ns, ny and 
n. This exercise is simplified considerably by the proportionality assumption 
(39). Since AC  = (1  +  7 ) M C  and, in equilibrium, AC = j^ l +  m  (  £7)]  M C  
one obtains
For a given function m  (.), y is determined by L  and 7  only. Since x* =  y /L , 
x* depends on 7  only. Firm labour demand is given by (27). Imposing c(.) =  
A ( , ) 7  it is easy to show that
i* =  / ( l  +  i )  (45)
Therefore, firm labour demand depends on /  and 7  only.
3.4.6 T rade liberalization
Focusing on core com petencies Consider first a move from autarky to 
free trade, which is equivalent to an increase in the labour force in this model. 
If two identical countries of the type outlined above move from autarky to 
free trade, the effect is simply a doubling of the labour force. Globalization is 
often referred to by the business press as forcing firms to focus on their core
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competencies which is exactly what the model predicts. The effect of trade 
liberalization on y and s is depicted in figure (5) which plots the P M X  and 
ZP C  schedules as well as s (y) as defined by equation (29). As can be seen from 
equations (29), (34), and (36), an increase in the labour force shifts the P M X  
curve down while leaving the other curves unchanged. Trade liberalization 
thus leads to an increase in real wage and output but to a decrease in vertical 
firm size. In the model, the larger market toughens competition by increasing 
the demand elasticity facing the final good producers. Final good producers 
respond to this by reducing their mark-ups and increasing their outputs. These 
increased outputs make variable costs more important relative to fixed costs 
so that, in equilibrium, firms will downsize to achieve a more efficient vertical 
scale. Firms will concentrate on their core competencies, i.e. cover a smaller 
segment of the value chain, as they expand horizontally. Trade liberalization 
is thus associated with outsourcing in this framework. Since there axe no 
trade costs in the model and countries are assumed to be symmetric, there 
is no explicit distinction between the home country and the foreign country. 
Whether outsourcing occurs domestically or internationally (‘offshoring’) is 
hence indeterminate in this model.
P ro d u c tiv ity  effect Notice that trade liberalization leads to an increase 
in firm productivity, as the equilibrium point moves down the Z P C  curve 
(recall that the ZP C  curve also captures inverse labour productivity). Un­
derlying this productivity effect is an increasing returns to scale effect and an 
outsourcing effect. This is depicted in figure (6 ). The increasing returns to 
scale effect is the productivity effect which would occur if vertical firm size
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p/w
PM X
P M X ’
ZPC
s(y)
Figure 5: Trade liberalization
was fixed. The outsourcing effect is the additional productivity effect brought 
about by the endogeneity of vertical firm size. Consider first the construction 
of the Z P C  schedules in figure (6 ). Suppose that vertical firm size is fixed 
at an arbitrary level s .33 Since s (y) minimizes T C  (y) and hence also AC (y) 
with respect to s, this s is suboptimal unless y = y, where y is implicitly 
defined by s = s (y). Therefore, the average cost curve of the restricted model 
must be strictly above the average cost curve of the unrestricted model, unless 
y = y  and both curves coincide. As the ZP C  curves are proportional to the 
average cost curves, the ZP C  curve of the restricted model must thus also 
be strictly above the Z P C  curve of the unrestricted model unless y =  y, as 
drawn in figure (6 ). Suppose now that the initial equilibrium is at y — y and
33 Notice that the model then essentially reduces to Krugman (1979). As can be seen 
from equation (7), a final good producer then has a constant fixed cost and a constant 
marginal cost ^ C  (§) ,  just as in Krugman (1979).
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consider the impact of a trade liberalization. It is easy to show that the output 
response to the trade liberalization is larger in the unrestricted case than in 
the restricted case. This is because marginal costs are decreasing rather than 
constant in output in the unrestricted case. The increasing returns to scale 
effect is captured by the distance between A and B in figure (6 ), whereas the 
outsourcing effect is given by the distance between B and C. Hence, there is 
a genuine outsourcing effect in this model which goes beyond the traditional 
increasing returns to scale effect.
O th er effects The effects on the remaining endogenous variables are as 
follows. The number of varieties available to consumers increases, while con­
sumption per worker per final good is unchanged. Due to the reduced vertical 
firm sizes, the number of firms within each value chain increases. Interestingly, 
the number of workers hired by each individual firm is unaffected so that firm 
scale only changes as measured by output. Therefore, the total number of 
firms operating in each country remains unchanged. Hence, despite a reduc­
tion in the number of varieties produced in each country, trade liberalization 
does not lead to net exit of domestic firms in this model.
3.4.7 D ecreasing th e  leng th  of th e  value chain /technolog ical progress
Consider now a reduction in the length of the value chain. Since a shorter 
value chain implies that fewer tasks need to be performed to manufacture 
the final product, this change can be interpreted as reflecting technological 
progress. The effect of a change in v on (£)*, y* and s* is depicted in figure 
(7). (£)* decreases by the same proportion as v but y* and s* are unchanged. 
As can be verified easily, x *, I* are also unchanged, n* increases by the same
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(labor productivity)'1
A
C
B
ZPC restricted
ZPC unrestricted
y y> yc y
A —► B: Increasing returns to scale effect 
B —► C: Outsourcing effect
Figure 6 : Decomposition of productivity effects
proportion as v falls but n* falls by the same proportion as v falls so that the 
total number of firms remains unchanged.
3.4.8 Changes in the cost structure
To analyse changes in the cost structure it is useful to express the Z P C  curve 
and the P M X  curve explicitly in terms of the cost parameters. Substituting 
restriction (43) into the first order condition (29) and rearranging yields
Using this result in equations (36) and (34) yields the following expressions 
for the ZPC- curve and the P M X  curve, respectively,
(46)
(47)
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Figure 7: Technological progress
p _  v 
Lu 2 1 + m (!)] .1 +  7.
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(48)
C hanges in  fixed costs The effect of an increase in fixed costs on the real 
wage as well as horizontal and vertical firm size is depicted in figure (8 ). As 
can be seen from equations (46-48), an increase in /  shifts up the P M X  curve 
and the Z P C  curve by the same proportion and shifts down s (y). Hence, the 
real wage falls, output per firm stays constant and firms get larger horizontally. 
The insourcing, of course, comes along with a fall in the number of firms per 
value chain, which is exactly what one would expect following an increase in 
fixed costs. Of course, this implies that each firm has to cover a longer segment 
of the value chain so that, on average, tasks are further away from the firms’ 
core competencies causing higher aggregate variable costs. Consumption per
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final good remains unchanged, each firm hires more workers, the number of 
varieties falls and so does the total number of firms.
p/w
PMX’(p/w)0
ZPC’
'MX
ZE£
s(y)
s(y)’
s0
Si
s
Figure 8 : Increased fixed production costs
C hanges in  governance costs Consider first an increase in A. As shown 
in figure (9) this decreases real wage and vertical firm size but leaves output 
per firm unaffected. Again, the decrease in vertical firm size is exactly what 
one would expect to happen in response to an increase in this component of 
internal governance costs. Consumption per final good is unaffected and so 
is the number of workers hired by each firm. The number of firms per value 
chain increases but the number of varieties decreases at the same proportion 
so that the total number of firms is unaffected.
Consider now an increase in 7 . The effect on both the P M X  curve as 
well as the Z P C  curve is ambiguous, so a graphical illustration as above is
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not very insightful. From equation (44) it is clear, however, that y* increases, 
from equation (45) it follows that I* falls. Since L  is unchanged, x* will 
increase with y*. Differentiating (46) reveals that s* falls and hence n* rises. 
As expected, an increase in this component of internal governance costs hence 
triggers outsourcing to save on marginal costs. The effect on , n* and n* 
is ambiguous.
p/w
(p/w).
PMX*(p/w)0
ZPC’
'MX
z e a
s(y)’
s(y)
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Figure 9: Increased internal governance costs
3.5 C onclusion
In this chapter, I developed a simple general equilibrium model of trade in 
which trade liberalization leads to outsourcing as firms focus on their core 
competencies in response to tougher competition. Since firms are better at 
performing tasks the closer they are to their core competencies, this outsourc­
ing increases firm productivity. Besides establishing this result, I also investi­
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gated the links between various technological parameters and outsourcing. In 
particular, I analysed how technological progress, changes in fixed costs, and 
changes in internal governance costs affect firms’ integration decisions.
Essentially, the model relates Adam Smith’s famous proposition that the 
division of labour is limited by the extent of the market to the topic of vertical 
integration. The larger the market, the more important become variable costs 
relative to fixed costs in the model so that, in equilibrium, the production 
tasks are divided among a larger number of leaner vertically related firm.
So far, the focusing on core competencies is just a plausible channel through 
which trade liberalization may affect firm productivity. To substantiate the 
importance of that link, rigorous empirical research is now required. Given 
that trade-induced increases in firm productivity have been found in several 
empirical studies, this seems to be a promising project for future work in this 
area.
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4 A  ‘N ew  Trade’ Theory o f G A T T /W T O  Negotia­
tions
4.1  In trod u ction
“Without cooperation, we will be lost Without institutions there will be little 
cooperation. And without a knowledge of how institutions work -  and what 
makes them work well -  there are likely to be fewer, and worse, institutions 
than if  such knowledge is widespread”. Robert O. Keohane34
International trade has been liberalized dramatically during the past half- 
century. Since the end of World War II, the average ad valorem tariff on 
manufacturing goods has been reduced from over 40 percent to below 4 per­
cent, making this undoubtedly one of the most important ever acts of economic 
policy making.
It is widely agreed that this liberalization was largely the result of a se­
quence of successful ‘rounds’ of trade negotiations governed by the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later its successor the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). The GATT/WTO is an institution regulating 
trade negotiations through a number of specific articles. The principles of 
reciprocity and nondiscrimination are generally considered to be the essence 
of these articles. The former requires that trade policy changes keep changes 
in import volumes equal across trading partners. The latter stipulates that the 
same tariff must be applied against all trading partners for any given traded 
product.35
34Robert O. Keohane is a leading American international relations theorist. This quote is 
taken from Gruber (2000).
351 adopt here Bagwell and Staiger’s (1999) interpretation of the rules of reciprocity and
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Against this background, I address the following two questions in this 
chapter: first, why was the GATT/WTO so successful in achieving trade 
liberalization? And second, what was the role played by the principles of 
reciprocity and nondiscrimination?
As is well-known, the neoclassical theory of trade negotiations already of­
fers standard answers to these questions. Its main argument was developed 
by Johnson (1953-1954) and later formulated in modern game-theoretic terms 
by Mayer (1981): in a neoclassical environment, large countries have an in­
centive to impose import tariffs to improve their terms-of-trade vis-a-vis their 
trading partners. However, if all countries impose import tariffs to improve 
their terms-of-trade, no country actually succeeds and inefficiently high tariffs 
prevail. The purpose of GATT/WTO negotiations is then to bargain over 
a reduction in these inefficiently high tariffs. While this main argument es­
tablished the need for trade negotiations, it remained silent about the role 
of reciprocity and nondiscrimination. This was then rectified by Bagwell and 
Staiger (1999), who demonstrated how these principles can be interpreted 
as useful bargaining rules which help countries escape such a terms-of-trade 
driven Prisoners’ dilemma.36
However, this standard theory has two major shortcomings. First, it is 
inconsistent with the actual GATT/WTO agreement in one important dimen­
sion. In particular, the GATT/WTO does not constrain the use of export taxes
nondiscrimination. For a detailed discussion of how this interpretation is derived from 
GATT/W TO articles, see chapter 3 of Bagwell and Staiger (2002).
36 An alternative theory of multilateral trade agreements is provided by Maggi (1999). It 
emphasizes enforcement considerations, arguing that lower tariffs can be enforced if multi­
lateral retaliation is possible. Another alternative theory of trade agreements (bilateral or 
multilateral) is offered by Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998 and forthcoming). It stresses 
commitment considerations, pointing out that trade agreements may help governments com­
mit vis-4-vis domestic special interest groups. However, neither of these theories focuses on 
the detailed principles of GATT/W TO negotiations which is the topic of the present chapter.
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and therefore does not prevent countries from influencing their terms-of-trade. 
This is because, by Lerner symmetry, import tariffs and export taxes have ex­
actly the same effects in general equilibrium .37 Hence, if countries’ trade 
policy choices were really driven by a desire to influence their terms-of-trade, 
the GATT/WTO should lead to a widespread use of export taxes. This is, 
however, not observed in practice (see Ethier 2002 for a vivid discussion of that 
inconsistency). Second, many economists simply feel that real-world trade ne­
gotiations are not about preventing terms-of-trade manipulations. Krugman 
(1997), for example, writes that “this optimal tariff argument plays almost 
no role in real-world trade disputes” . Instead, securing foreign market access 
seems to be the core concern of policy makers. Bagwell and Staiger (1999), 
for example, quote the following passage from a GATT panel report: “. . .  the 
main value of a tariff concession is that it provides better market access” .
In this chapter, I address these two shortcomings. Thus, I develop a novel 
theory of GATT/WTO negotiations which is consistent with the fact that ex­
port taxes are not constrained by the GATT/WTO. Moreover, it does not rely 
on the terms-of-trade mechanism but more directly emphasizes market access 
considerations. To achieve this, I consider trade negotiations in a monopo- 
listically competitive environment. I first argue that tariffs are inefficiently 
high in the non-cooperative equilibrium because countries attempt to improve 
their relative market access at the expense of other countries in order to attract 
manufacturing firms from abroad. I then show how GATT/WTO negotiations 
can help countries overcome this inefficiency by providing new rationales for
37 Intuitively, the price of exports relative to imports can be increased either by imposing 
an import tariff which reduces world demand for the import product thereby making it 
cheaper, or by imposing an export tax which reduces the world supply of the export product 
thereby malting it more expensive.
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the fundamental GATT/WTO principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, 
I develop the basic two-country model and use this model to establish that the 
non-cooperative equilibrium is inefficient and demonstrate how trade negotia-
outcome. In the third section, I then develop a three-country extension of this
the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination. A final section concludes.
4.2 T h e  basic m od el
4.2.1 Setup
The basic model is a variant of the standard Krugman (1980) ‘new trade’ model 
with transport costs. There are two countries: Home and Foreign. Variables 
relating to Foreign are identified by an asterisk. Consumers have access to 
a continuum of differentiated manufacturing goods and a single homogeneous 
‘outside good’. Preferences over these goods are identical in both countries. 
They are given by the following utility functions
where m  (i) denotes consumption of a differentiated manufacturing good, Y  
denotes consumption of the homogeneous outside good, n is the ‘number’ 
of manufacturing goods produced, a is the elasticity of substitution between
tions governed by the principle of reciprocity help countries attain an efficient
basic model and use this extended model to evaluate the joint functioning of
" n+n*
J££_  
O' —1
a > 1 (49)
L o
" n+n*
jta_
O’ —1
(50)
L o
manufacturing goods, and ji is the share of income spent on manufacturing 
goods. Technologies are also identical in both countries. They are summarized 
by the following (inverse) production functions
lM = f  + cqM (51)
l*M = f  + cq*M (52)
lY = qY (53)
l*Y = q*Y (54)
where lM (lY ) is the labour requirement for producing qM (qY ) units of a 
manufacturing good (the outside good), and /  (c) denotes the fixed (marginal) 
labour requirement of manufacturing production. The manufacturing goods 
market is monopolistically competitive whereas the outside good market is 
perfectly competitive. Trade costs only apply to manufacturing goods and 
take the familiar ‘iceberg’ form. These ‘iceberg’ trade costs are denoted by 
<j>. They are further decomposed into ‘iceberg’ transport costs 0, which are 
identical across countries, and ‘iceberg’ tariffs r ,  which may be different across 
countries, so that
((> = 0 + t , 0 > 1 ,  r > 0  (55)
(j>* = 0 + T *’ 0 > 1 ,  r * > 0  (56)
These ‘iceberg’ tariffs are the only new addition to the model. Their ‘iceberg’ 
nature helps preserve the model’s tractability because like that no tariff rev­
enue is generated. For simplicity, I also make the following three additional
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assumptions: first, I assume that Home and Foreign are of equal size and are 
both inhabited by L  workers/consumers. Second, I assume that the outside 
good sector is always active in both countries. This is ensured for all possible 
(r, r*) if and only if demand for manufacturing goods is sufficiently small: 
/i < \  (see appendix A1 for details). Third, I assume that the manufactur­
ing sector is always active in both countries. This is ensured for all possible 
( t , t * ) if and only if transport costs axe sufficiently large: 9 > Q ) l~° (see 
again appendix A1 for details).
4.2.2 No trade policy
Consider now the equilibrium at Home and Foreign, exogenously fixing tariffs 
at some level. Choose pY =  1 and notice that this implies w = w* = 1 , where 
w is the wage rate, since the outside good sector is always active in both 
countries, the outside good market is perfectly competitive, the outside good 
is produced using the above technology, and is freely traded among countries. 
As is well-known, utility maximization with the above preferences then yields 
the following demands for the outside good
y  =  ( l - M ) i  (57)
y* = ( i - p ) i  
and the following demands for each manufacturing good
(58)
m  {j) +  m* 0 ) =  pL<Pl r V (60)
where the former is the demand facing a Home manufacturing firm, the latter 
is the demand facing a Foreign manufacturing firm, p (i) denotes the ex-factory 
price of a manufacturing good, and the price indices are given by
G =
G* =
n n
JP(i)i-°di+J wmx-°dj 
.0 0
n n*f  ffip (0 1 1 ”  di + jp*  0 ) 1_<r dj
1
1 — <T
(61)
(62)
L0 0
Since these manufacturing demand functions have a constant price elasticity
of cr, profit-maximization implies that manufacturing firms charge a constant
mark-up over marginal costs so that
C7C
p {i)= p *  (j) = ----- 7 =P(7 — 1 (63)
which implies that the price indices simplify to
G = p  [n +  n  V " ]  1~‘ (64)
(65)
Free entry drives manufacturing firms’ profits down to zero leading to the 
following break-even outputs
q  =  q  =
f(c7 - 1 )
(66)
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and hence the following break-even labour demands
1 =  1* =  f a (67)
Manufacturing market clearing thus requires
(68)
q = nL4>1- ‘’- ^  + »L- P 'G* i-< (69)
which can be solved for the equilibrium price indices
G = qv° ( i  — ^*1~g) 
fiL  [l -  W ) 1" 7]
1
<7—1
(70)
G* =
qp* (1 - 0 1 *)
1
<7 —  1
(71)
jxL  [l -
These equilibrium price indices can then be solved for the equilibrium numbers 
of manufacturing firms
n = pLqp
1—a_________ 0
1—a (72)
n = pLqp
* 1— a
* 1—<7 (73)
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Notice that this implies that the world number of manufacturing firms is al­
ways constant and given by38
(74)
Notice further that, given the above demands, the indirect utility functions 
are
so that each country’s welfare is decreasing in its manufacturing price index.
4.2.3 T rade policy
Consider now the governments’ tariff choices. I assume throughout that tariffs 
are set by governments in an attempt to maximize their citizens’ welfare. The 
discussion in this section is structured around four propositions. Proposition 1 
summarizes the benchmark case of noncooperative tariffs setting, proposition 
2 describes the set of Pareto efficient tariff combinations, and propositions 3 
and 4 establish how trade negotiations governed by the principle of reciprocity 
can help countries attain an efficient outcome:
Proposition  1  Suppose governments choose tariffs simultaneously, Home max­
imizing V  and Foreign maximizing V *. Then the only Nash equilibrium tariff 
combination which is robust to small perturbations in the governments ’ strate-
38 This is because world expenditure on manufacturing goods is constant and given by 2fiL  
and firm sales are constant and given by qp. This, of course, depends on the particular 
functional form assumptions made above.
V  = ^  (1 -  LG~" (75)
V* = LG—'* (76)
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gies (i.e. ‘trembling-hand perfect’)  is (r ,r* ) =  (oo, oo) 39
Proof. Given the form of V, V  is maximized when G is minimized. Also, 
=  ~ [ l- ^ * ) 1-"]G so t h a t  W  <  0 f o r  a11 T* 6 I 0 ’ 0 0 )  and =  0  for
r* =  oo. Hence, Home maximizes V  by choosing r  =  oo if r* £ [0, oo) and 
any possible r  if r* =  oo. Similarly, Foreign maximizes V* by choosing r* = oo 
if r  6  [0, oo) and any possible t* if r  =  oo. Thus, the set of Nash equilibrium 
tariffs consists of all ( t , t * )  such that either (r,r* ) =  (oo, any possible r*) 
or ( t ,t* )  =  (any possible r , oo). However, if the governments’ strategies are 
subject to small perturbations, Home’s (Foreign’s) best response is always to 
choose r  =  oo (r* =  oo). Therefore, (r,r* ) =  (oo, oo) is the only Nash equi­
librium tariff pair which is robust to small perturbations in the governments’ 
strategies (i.e. ‘trembling-hand perfect’) ■
Hence, noncooperative tariff setting leads to autarky. This result arises 
because each government always has an incentive to unilaterally increase its 
tariff.40 The intuition for this is as follows: a unilateral increase in the own 
tariff increases the relative market access of firms in the own country by re­
ducing the absolute market access of firms in the other country. This makes
39T wo technical asides: 1) since oo is not a number, the correct notation would be ( r ,  r* )  —► 
(oo, oo). But since such correct notation would unnecessarily complicate the exposition of the 
proofs below, I consistently avoid it in this paper; 2) since oo is not a number, it is somewhat 
unclear what setting r  =  oo would mean in practice. This problem could be avoided by 
assuming that tariffs must be below some finite upper bound r .  This modification would 
leave all results substantially unchanged. However, it would conceal that governments have 
an incentive to completely choke off manufacturing imports in this model and is therefore 
not adopted.
40 Strictly speaking, a country has an incentive to unilaterally increase its tariff only if 
the other country’s tariff is finite. This is because otherwise the own price index becomes 
independent of the own tariff. The reason for this is as follows: If the other country’s tariff 
is infinity, the own firms are only selling in the own market so that the demands they face 
depend only on the own price index. Since these demands must be unchanged in equilibrium 
to ensure that the own firms make zero-profits, a change in the own tariff must therefore also 
keep the own price index unchanged. This is also why there is a whole set of Nash equilibria 
so that an equilibrium refinement needs to be imposed.
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the own country a relatively more attractive business location thus trigger­
ing a relocation of firms towards the own country. This, in turn, reduces 
the own price index and hence increases the own welfare. This mechanism is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘Venables Effect’, since it was first described in 
Venables (1987). Notice that governments would never impose export taxes 
in this model. This is because an export tax deteriorates a country’s relative 
market access thereby making firms move abroad .41
It stands to reason that this noncooperative equilibrium is inefficient, as 
there are always gains from trade. Less clear, however, is which tariff combi­
nations are efficient. This is the subject of the second proposition:
Proposition 2 The set of Pareto-efficient tariff combinations consists of all 
( t , t * ) such that (r,r* ) =  (any possible r , 0 )  or ( t , t * )  =  ( 0 ,  any possible r*)
Proof. A tariff combination (r, r*) cannot be Pareto efficient if there exist 
possible Pareto improving tariff changes (dr, dr*) at (r,r*). This includes 
tariff changes (dr, dr*) such that dG* < 0 and dG = 0. From total differenti­
ation, dG = g?dr-t- Jp d r*  and dG* =  * ^ d r  + ^prdr*. Therefore, dG =  0 if 
dr = so that dG* =  (gpr — J p )  dr* along dG = 0 . Notice
that §=£ _  J £  > o if r* 6  [0 , oo) and that fg l  -  J p  =  0  if r* =
oo T h is  is  b eca u se  ^  Q  dG  =  ( i - ^ ~ g) ^ - g Q  =oo. I  m s is  b eca u se  9t  dr*  ( i - ^*1- ct) [ i ’ dT
( l dG * _  {cj>4>*)-°<i> r * , h . 8G * 8G * dT dG  _
^ r .  Hence, there exist Pareto improving tariff changes (dr, dr*) for all ( t , t * ) ,  
t* =£ oo. These (dr, dr*) are such that dr < 0 and dr* < 0 and are thus 
possible if and only if r  > 0 and r* > 0. If r* =  oo, g? — dQ _  dGl = q and
41 Essentially, the Lerner symmetry theorem is reversed in this environment. Export taxes 
imposed by Home are now equivalent to import tariffs imposed by Foreign rather than Home.
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> 0 unless also r  =  oo. Hence, there also exist Pareto improving tariff 
changes (dr, dr*) for all (r, r*), r  ^  oo, r* = oo. These (dr, dr*) are such that 
dr < 0 and are thus possible if and only if r  > 0. Finally, it is straightforward 
to verify that (r ,r* ) =  (oo,oo) is also not Pareto efficient since there exist 
possible Pareto improving tariff changes (A r ,  A r*) (e.g. complete trade lib­
eralization). Therefore, only (r,r* ) such that ( t , t * )  =  (any possible r ,  0) or 
( t , t * )  =  (0, any possible r*) can be Pareto efficient. It is easy to verify that 
for none of these ( t , t * )  there exists another ( t , t * )  which makes one country 
better off without making the other country worse off. Therefore, they are 
also indeed Pareto efficient. ■
Corollary 1 The trade war equilibrium tariffs (r, r*) =  (oo, oo) are ineffi­
cient
Intuitively, Pareto improvements can only be achieved through bilateral 
tariff reductions. This is because a unilateral tariff cut reduces the welfare of 
the liberalizing country, due to the ‘Venables Effect’. However, bilateral tariff 
reductions are only possible if tariffs are positive in both countries so that 
Pareto improvements cannot be achieved if the tariff is zero in at least one of 
the countries.
Corollary 1 implies that there is scope for trade negotiations, since both 
countries can gain from a tariff reduction. Nash bargaining would be one 
simple way of modelling such trade negotiations.42 However, this would not 
adequately capture the ‘rules-based’ nature of GATT/WTO negotiations and
42 This route has been pursued in the earlier contributions to the Neoclassical theory of 
trade negotiations. See Dixit (1987) for a review. In the context of the model discussed 
here, it is easy to show that the Nash bargaining solution is free trade, if one allows for side 
payments. This is because free trade maximizes world welfare.
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would hence be ill-suited to shed light on the roles played by the principles 
of reciprocity and nondiscrimination.43 Instead, I proceed with the following 
observation:
Proposition 3 Define a tariff change (A r, A r*) to be reciprocal if  it is such 
that A TBm  — 0, where TBm  =  E X  Pm — IM Pm  and E X  Pm (IM Pm) refers 
to the value of manufacturing exports (imports) . 44 Then, starting from any 
tariff combination ( t , t * ) ,  tariff changes leave the number of firms unchanged 
in both countries if  and only if  they are reciprocal
Proof. By definition, TB m  =  pLpl~a (n0*1-<TG*a_:l — n*01-<TG?<T_1) so that 
^  = Ak°- f t  =  +  from Home’s
manufacturing market clearing condition. Hence, n  =  ^  4 - which implies 
that A n =  0 if and only if A TBm  =  0. Finally, since n  +  n* = 2 ^ ,  A n =  0 
if and only if A n* =  0 ■
Thus, if tariff changes are restricted to be reciprocal, both countries are 
no longer able to attract firms from the other country. To gain a better 
understanding of this observation, it is useful to consider in more detail the 
key equation of the above proof:
n = p L  +  TB M (77)
qp  qp
It states that the number of manufacturing firms at Home consists of the 
number of manufacturing firms Home would have under autarky plus the ad­
43 See Bagwell and Staiger (1999) and especially Bagwell and Staiger (2002) for a more 
detailed discussion of why GATT/W TO negotiations are not well-characterized by Nash 
bargaining.
44 Notice that T B m  =  —T B m  s o  that also A T B m  =  0 if tariff changes are reciprocal.
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ditional number of firms required to satisfy the net demand from Foreign. To 
see this, notice that fiL  is Home’s expenditure on manufacturing goods, T B m  
is Foreign’s net expenditure on Home’s manufacturing goods, and qp is the 
(constant) level of firm sales. Hence, if Foreign’s net expenditure on Home’s 
manufacturing goods is fixed by reciprocity, Home’s (and hence also Foreign’s) 
number of manufacturing firms is fixed as well.
Since inefficiently high tariffs arise only because both countries attempt 
to attract firms from the other country, this observation suggests that the 
principle of reciprocity can help countries achieve an efficient outcome by neu­
tralizing the ‘Venables Effect’. To see that this is indeed the case, consider the 
following tariff setting game which, I believe, captures some of the essential 
features of GATT/WTO negotiations:
P roposition  4 Suppose tariffs are set in the following three-stage game: in 
the first stage, governments choose tariffs cooperatively according to some bar­
gaining protocol. In the second stage, Home has the opportunity to deviate 
from the cooperative tariff by choosing any possible tariff to which Foreign 
can respond reciprocally.45 In the third stage, Foreign responds reciprocally to 
Home’s deviation.46 Then, Home does not deviate in the second stage if and 
only if  efficient tariffs are chosen in the first stage. Moreover, if  inefficient 
tariffs are chosen in the first stage, Home’s deviation is such that tariffs are 
efficient after the third stage
45 This assumption is only made to simplify the exposition. It is easy to verify that H would 
anyway never find it optimal to choose a tariff to which F cannot respond reciprocally.
46Similar to Bagwell and Staiger (1999), I hence assume that the GATT/W TO can per­
fectly enforce the principle of reciprocity (and later also the principle of nondiscrimination). 
See Maggi (1999) for a model of multilateral trade agreements that puts enforcement issues 
at centre stage.
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Proof. Suppose that the governments have agreed on some arbitrary tariffs 
in the first stage and consider Home’s incentives to choose any other tariff 
to which Foreign can respond reciprocally given that Foreign then indeed re­
sponds reciprocally. Notice that > 0 at all ( t , t * )  if dr is followed by a 
reciprocal dr*. This is because reciprocal tariff changes leave the number of 
firms unchanged (from proposition 3) and G =  p  [n +  n*01-<T] 1-17. Therefore, 
Home has an incentive to reduce r  at any (r,r* ). However, a reduction in r  is 
possible if and only if r  > 0. Moreover, a reciprocal response to a reduction in 
r  is possible if and only if r* > 0. This is because (dr, dr*) is reciprocal if and
J. —  &  J.* —<7
only if it is such that —\ —a^ dr =  ^ 1_g^ dr*, from Home’s manufacturing 
market clearing condition. Hence, Home does not deviate in the second stage 
if and only if r  = 0 and/or r* = 0. Moreover, if r  >  0 and r* > 0, the 
deviation is such that r  =  0 and/or r* =  0 after the third stage. These tariff 
combinations are efficient (from proposition 2 ). ■
The intuition for this finding is as follows: in this model, imposing a tariff 
has two effects on welfare. First, it tends to increase the domestic price index 
by making imported manufacturing goods more expensive. Second, it tends 
to reduce the domestic price index by attracting manufacturing firms from 
abroad. Normally, the latter effect dominates the former so that countries 
have an incentive to impose a tariff. However, the latter effect is neutralized 
by reciprocity so that then only the former effect remains. When given the 
opportunity to deviate, Home therefore has an incentive to lower its tariff 
by as much as possible so that either Home’s or Foreign’s tariff is eventually 
reduced to zero.
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4.3  T h ree-coun try  ex ten sion
4.3.1 Setup
While the basic two-country model is useful to illustrate the purpose of trade 
negotiations and the role played by the principle of reciprocity, it is too simple 
to shed light on the role played by the principle of nondiscrimination. For this 
reason, I develop an extension of the basic model in this section. In particular,
1 focus on the simplest possible setup that allows for discriminatory tariff set­
ting. There are now three countries: Home, Foreign 1, and Foreign 2. Home 
trades with both Foreign 1 and Foreign 2, but Foreign 1 and Foreign 2 trade 
with Home only so that only Home can set discriminatory tariffs. Everything 
else is just as in the basic model.47 The notation is a straightforward gener­
alization of the one used before. For example, t \ is now the tariff imposed by 
Home against imports from Foreign 1, is now the tariff imposed by Foreign
2 against imports from Home, and G\ is the manufacturing price index of 
Foreign 1.
4.3.2 N o trade policy
The derivation of the equilibrium proceeds exactly as before and is thus not 
repeated here in detail. Instead, I focus only on its key steps and present only 
the model’s key relationships. As before, all firms charge the same price in
47 One further difference is as follows: For simplicity, I again assume that the outside 
good sector is active in all countries and that the manufacturing sector is always active in all 
countries. However, this now requires tighter parameter restrictions: fj, <  |  and 0 >  ( | )  l ~a , 
respectively. Details can again be found in appendix A l.
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equilibrium and the price indices can be written as
(78)
G ? = p [ n ^ 1" '  +  n5] >«
Manufacturing market clearing requires
,1 -u  P pq =  pL<t>i
9 -  pL<j>2
(79)
(80)
(81)
(82)
(83)
where the equations refer to Home, Foreign 1, and Foreign 2, respectively. 
These equations can be solved for the equilibrium price indices. Defining
*1—a j l * 1 —a (84)
=  w r *
L * \ l  — C7
(85)
(86) 
(87)
they can be written as
G = qpafr
jjlLQ .
(88)
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q * =  <7" 1
1 [ pLQ _ (89)
r * _  r^ i ,7- 1
2 . VLV .
i
(90)
These price indices can then be solved for the equilibrium number of firms
tiL  r i
qp 4>i $ 2 (91)
n i ~ ~  ST +  jr- ^qp $ 2  $
(92)
m l i - o m p 1" 7 ; ( ^ p 1- 7 </41~ ‘7
$ 2  $ (93)
These expressions again imply that the world number of manufacturing firms 
is constant. Since there are now three countries, it is given by
establish that the basic model’s main results carry over to the three-country 
model. The intuitions for these propositions are analogous to the intuitions 
given above for propositions 1-4 and are thus not repeated here. First, the 
trade-war equilibrium is autarky:
P ro position  5 Suppose governments choose tariffs simultaneously, Home max­
imizing V , Foreign 1 maximizing V f, and Foreign 2 maximizing V£. Then 
the only Nash equilibrium tariff combination which is robust to small per-
I * i * On +  n\ -1- no =  3—  
q p
(94)
4.3.3 T rade policy
The following four propositions are generalizations of propositions 1-4. They
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turbations in the governments’ strategies (i.e. ‘trembling-hand perfect’) is 
( t i ,  t 2, t{, r j )  =  (oo, oo, oo, oo)
Proof. The proof is a generalization of the proof of proposition 1. It can be 
found in appendix A2  ■
Second, the Pareto efficient tariff combinations are such that at least one 
tariff is zero in each of the two bilateral trading relationships. This implies 
that the trade-war equilibrium tariffs are inefficient:
Proposition 6 The set of Pareto-efficient tariff combinations consists of all 
(r i>r 2 >TijT2) such that (i) ( t i j t J )  =  (any possible t i , 0 ) or =  (0 , any possible r j )
and (ii) ( t 2 , Tjj) =  {any possible T2 , 0 ) or ( t 2 ,T2) =  (0 , any possible t2)
Proof. The proof is a generalization of the proof of proposition 2. It can be 
found in appendix A3 ■
Corollary 2 The trade war equilibrium tariffs (r i, T2 , r \ ,  r^) =  (00, 00, 00, 00) 
are inefficient
Third, no country is able to attract firms from another country if tariff 
changes keep all countries’ manufacturing trade balances unchanged:
Proposition 7 Define a tariff change (A r \,  A T2 , A r{, A r 2) to be multilat- 
erally reciprocal if  it is such that A TB*M1 = A  TB*M2 =  0, where T B =
E X P f/Ii — IM P fjj and E X P { I M P f j f )  refers to the value of manufactur­
ing exports (imports) in country Foreign z.48 Then, starting from any tariff
4 8 Notice that TBm  =  — (TBmi + TBm2)  so that also A TBm — 0  if tariff changes are 
multilaterally reciprocal.
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vector ( ti ,T 2 , tJ ,T 2 ), tariff changes leave the number of firms unchanged in 
all countries if and only if they are multilaterally reciprocal
Proof. The proof is a generalization of the proof of proposition 3. It can be 
found in appendix A4 ■
And fourth, if tariff changes are restricted to keep all countries’ manu­
facturing trade balances unchanged, this can help governments achieve an 
efficient outcome:
P roposition  8  Suppose tariffs are set in the following three-stage game: in 
the first stage, governments choose tariffs cooperatively according to some bar­
gaining protocol In the second stage, Home has the opportunity to deviate 
from the cooperative tariffs by choosing any possible tariffs to which Foreign 1 
and Foreign 2 can respond in a multilaterally reciprocal fashion. In the third 
stage, Foreign 1 and Foreign 2 respond in a multilaterally reciprocal fashion. 
Then, Home does not deviate in the second stage i f  and only if efficient tariffs 
are chosen in the first stage. Moreover, if  inefficient tariffs are chosen in the 
first stage, Home’s deviation is such that tariffs are efficient after the third 
stage
Proof. The proof is a generalization of the proof of proposition 4. It can be 
found in appendix A5 ■
However, propositions 7 and 8  depend crucially on the fact that multilateral 
reciprocity is imposed. If instead, only bilateral reciprocity is imposed, firm 
relocations are not necessarily prevented. This is made more precise in the 
following proposition:
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P roposition  9 Define a tariff change (A A r*) to be bilaterally reciprocal 
if it is such that A TB*Mi =  0, where TB*Mi = E X P — IM P f/Ii and E X P  
{IM P ^f) refers to the value of manufacturing exports (imports) in country 
Foreign i. Then, starting from any tariff combination ( t i ,T 2 ,tJ ,T 2 ), a bilat­
erally reciprocal tariff change between Home and Foreign i keeps the number 
of firms constant in Foreign i but changes the number of firms in Home and 
Foreign j
Proof. Consider a bilaterally reciprocal tariff change (dri, drf) between Home 
and Foreign i. By definition, it leaves T B unchanged so that n* is also 
unchanged (c.f. the proof of proposition 7). However, it also leaves n and rij 
unchanged if and only if it is also multilaterally reciprocal (from proposition
7). This requires ^— f a l r f  dri = j^ ffr^zdT *  and (J 1r ; )5 - d ri =  0, from
manufacturing market clearing at Foreign i and Foreign j. But this implies 
dri =  dr* = 0  so that n  and n!- must change for any (nonzero) tariff change ■
Thus, while bilaterally reciprocal tariff changes prevent firm relocations 
between the tariff-changing country pair, they always also induce firm relo­
cations from or to the uninvolved country. This is because the uninvolved 
country is also affected by the tariff change through changes in Home’s price 
index. To see this more clearly, suppose that Home and Foreign 1 liberalize in 
a bilaterally reciprocal way. From the above discussion it should be obvious 
that this prevents firm relocations between Home and Foreign 1. However, 
it also reduces Home’s price index and thus reduces sales and profits of firms 
in Foreign 2 which requires firm relocations between Home and Foreign 2 to 
restore equilibrium.
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If the objective is to prevent firm relocations between all countries, the 
principle of reciprocity is therefore insufficient to the extent that it can be 
applied bilaterally. In view of this, the principle of nondiscrimination can then 
be interpreted as a simple way to ‘multilateralize’ the principle of reciprocity. 
To see this, consider the following proposition:
P roposition  10 Define tariffs to be nondiscriminatory if r \  =  T2 = t . Then, 
if tariffs are restricted to be nondiscriminatory, all bilaterally reciprocal tariff 
changes are also multilaterally reciprocal
Proof. If tariffs are restricted to be nondiscriminatory, dr\ =  dr2 so that 
purely bilateral tariff changes between Home and Foreign 1 or Home and For­
eign 2  are not possible. Hence, if tariff changes are nondiscriminatory and 
bilaterally reciprocal they must be bilaterally reciprocal between Home and 
Foreign 1 and Home and Foreign 2. Since tariff changes which are bilater­
ally reciprocal between Home and Foreign 1 and Home and Foreign 2 are also 
multilaterally reciprocal this implies that all tariff changes which are nondis­
criminatory and bilaterally reciprocal must also be multilaterally reciprocal
■
The reasoning for this is very simple: if Home is forced to impose the 
same tariff against Foreign 1 and Foreign 2, and both Foreign 1 and Foreign 2 
respond to tariff changes by Home in a bilaterally reciprocal way, both trade 
balances are kept constant so that multilateral reciprocity prevails.
Hence, all firm relocations are prevented if tariff changes are bilaterally 
reciprocal and nondiscriminatory so that these principles together can help 
countries move towards a more efficient outcome. However, the principle of
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nondiscrimination is an overly restrictive way of ‘multilateralizing’ the princi­
ple of reciprocity which implies that the final outcome can, but need not, be 
efficient. This result is established in the final proposition:
P roposition  1 1  Suppose tariffs are set in the following three-stage game: in 
all stages, Home is restricted to set nondiscriminatory tariffs only. In the first 
stage, governments choose tariffs cooperatively according to some bargaining 
protocol. In the second stage, Home has the opportunity to deviate from the 
cooperative tariffs by choosing any possible tariffs to which Foreign 1 and For­
eign 2 can both respond in a bilaterally reciprocal fashion. In the third stage, 
Foreign 1 and Foreign 2 both respond in a bilaterally reciprocal fashion. Then, 
Home does not deviate in the second stage i f  efficient tariffs are chosen in 
the first stage. However, Home also does not deviate in the second stage if  
particular inefficient tariffs are chosen in the first stage so that tariffs are not 
necessarily efficient after the third stage
Proof. Suppose that the governments have agreed on some arbitrary nondis­
criminatory tariffs in the first stage and consider Home’s incentives to choose 
any other nondiscriminatory tariffs to which Foreign 1 and Foreign 2 can both 
respond in a bilaterally reciprocal fashion given that Foreign 1 and Foreign 
2 then indeed both respond in a bilaterally reciprocal fashion. Notice that 
^  <  0  at all ( t ,  t | ,  T 2 ) if dr is followed by bilaterally reciprocal dr\ and dr 
This is because with nondiscrimination all bilaterally reciprocal tariff changes 
leave the number of firms unchanged in all countries (from propositions 7 and 
9) and G = p[n  + 01-<T (n\ +  n j ) ]1-<T. Therefore, Home has an incentive to 
reduce r  at any However, a reduction in r  is possible if and only if
84
r  > 0. Moreover, a bilaterally reciprocal response to a reduction in r  is possi­
ble if and only if r j  > 0 and r \  > 0. This is because (dr, dr\,dr*£) is bilaterally 
reciprocal if and only if it is such that -j-J —^ dr =  j ^ — ^ dri = J ^ t ^ y dr2 > 
from Foreign l ’s and Foreign 2’s manufacturing market clearing conditions. 
Hence, Home does not deviate in the second stage if and only if r  =  0 and/or 
r \  =  0 and/or r% = 0. This is includes all efficient tariff combinations which 
are possible under nondiscrimination, i.e. r  =  0  and/or r j  =  0  and r \  =  0 . 
But it also includes two kinds of inefficient tariff combinations, first r  > 0 and 
rJ > 0  and r \  =  0 , and second r  > 0  and r \  =  0  and t J  > 0  ■
As before, Home has an incentive to reduce its tariffs by as much as possible 
when given the opportunity to deviate. However, bilateral reciprocity and 
nondiscrimination can only be satisfied if all tariffs are lowered simultaneously. 
But this is impossible if at least one of the tariffs is equal to zero which is not 
sufficient to guarantee efficiency, from proposition 6 .
4 .4  C onclusion
In this chapter, I developed a ‘new trade’ theory of GATT/WTO negotia­
tions. I first argued that tariffs are inefficiently high in the non-cooperative 
equilibrium because countries attempt to improve their relative market access 
at the expense of other countries in order to attract manufacturing firms from 
abroad. I then showed how GATT/WTO negotiations can help countries 
overcome this inefficiency by providing new rationales for the fundamental 
GATT/WTO principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination.
This ‘new trade’ theory solves two important problems of the standard 
terms-of-trade theory. First, it is consistent with the fact that GATT/WTO
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regulations do not constrain export taxes. Second, it does not rely on the 
terms-of-trade argument but instead emphasizes market access considerations.
Still, much further work is needed. To fully develop this ‘new trade’ the­
ory of trade negotiations, three questions seem to be particularly important: 
first, do preferential trading agreements as permitted under GATT/WTO reg­
ulations in violation of the principle of nondiscrimination undermine mul­
tilateral trade negotiations? Second, what is the role of political economy 
considerations in multilateral trade negotiations? And third, how does the 
GATT/WTO enforce the rules of reciprocity and nondiscrimination? 49
49 See Bagwell and Staiger (2002) for a discussion of how these questions are addressed in 
the context of the standard terms-of-trade theory.
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4 .5  A p p en d ix
4.5.1 A l: Parameter restrictions 
Two-country model
1. The outside good sector is always active in both countries if and only 
if both countries are large enough to host the total number of world 
manufacturing firms. This implies that (n +  n*) I < L ^  < \  <*=*>
\L<\ .
2 . Suppose there are no manufacturing firms in country ia n d  consider the 
incentives to enter. It is straightforward to show that, at price p, at least
un^ s could be sold given any ( t ,t* ) . Hence, entry is always 
profitable if and only if > q <=> 0 1-<T <
Three-country model
1 . The outside good sector is always active in all countries if and only if all 
countries are large enough to host the total number of world manufactur­
ing firms. This implies that (n +  n\ +  ri^) I < L ^  < \  M < 3 -
2 . Suppose there are no manufacturing firms in country i and consider
the incentives to enter. It is straightforward to show that, at price p,
at least units could be sold given any ( ti ,T 2 , tJ ,T 2 ).p\/ ( —(-7^2 J
Hence, entry is always profitable if and only if pei - < r > Q
< I
4.5.2 A2: Proof o f proposition 5
for t* =  oo. Hence, H maximizes V  by choosing r* =  oo if r* G [0, oo) and 
any possible r* if r \  =  oo. Similarly, ——G* so that < 0
QQ*
for all Ti 6  [0, oo) and 75- f  =  0 for r* =  oo. Hence, Foreign i maximizes V*i
by choosing r* =  oo if r* G [0, oo) and any possible r* if r* =  oo. Thus, the 
set of Nash equilibrium tariffs consists of all ( t i ,T 2 , s u c h  that either 
(r i>r i) =  (°°» any possible r j )  or (7*1 , r}) =  (any possible r i ,  oo) and either 
( t 2 , r«|>) =  (0 0 , any possible r£) or ( t 2 ,T2 ) =  (any possible 7-2 , 0 0 ). However, 
if the governments’ strategies are subject to small perturbations, H’s (For­
eign i’s) best response is always to choose r* = 0 0  (r* =  0 0 ). Therefore, 
( ti ,T 2 ,r^ ,T 2 ) =  (0 0 , 0 0 , 0 0 , 0 0 ) is the only Nash equilibrium tariff combina­
tion which is robust to small perturbations in the governments’ strategies 
(‘trembling-hand perfect’) ■
4.5.3 A3: Proof of proposition 6
Proof. A tariff combination ( ti ,T 2 ,tJ ,T 2) cannot be Pareto efficient if there 
exist possible Pareto improving tariff changes (dri, d r2 , dr\, dr 2 ) at (r i, T2 , r |  , r  
This includes tariff changes (d r i ,d r 2 , ^Ti , ^ 2 ), d r 2 =  d r2 =  0, such that 
dG\ < 0 and dG = dG\ = 0. From total differentiation, dG = Jp“d ri +  ^ pjrdrf, 
dGi =  l fr tdTl +  lfr*dTi' and dC?2 =  ^ f d r i  +  | ^ d r j .  Therefore, dG =  0 if 
d ri =  — fiG ; f ^ Ti and dG£ =  0  if d ri =  ~ § G ^w fdri ’ Notice that these two 
conditions are identical. This is because —^ G , J-pi =  —G,
a n  ~  f2$2 2 ’ — 2 s o  t n a t  dG  d r i  ~
~ § G * ^ f -  Hence> along d G  =  d G 2 =  d G l  =  ^  f & l r f )  d r l ‘ No"
tice that > 0 if tJ e  [0, oo) and that =  0
if t \  =  oo. This is because —^ G J  which, together with the
derivatives given above, implies that Hence, there
exist Pareto improving tariff changes (dri, dr2, dTj, dr^), cLt2 =  dr 2 = 0, such 
that dGl < 0 and dG = dG\ =  0 for all (ti,T2,t{,T2), t} ^  00. These 
(1dri,dT2,drl,dT2) are such that dr\ < 0 and dr\ < 0 and are thus possible 
if and only if n  > 0 and r \  > 0. By symmetry, there also exist Pareto im­
proving tariff changes (dri,dT2,dr*,dT2), dri = dr\ = 0, such that dG\ < 0 
and dG =  dG\ =  0 for all (ti,T2,tJ,T2), t \ ^  00. These (dri,dT2,dTf,d72)
are such that dr2 < 0 and dr% < 0 and are thus possible if and only if T2 > 0
a n d  r*  >  0  T f 7-* —  t *  — 00 d G  -  dG _  dG _  dG _  dG* _  8G\ _  dG* _  a n a  r 2 >  u. n  r x — r 2 — 00 , a-ri — dri? ^  ~  dr% ~  d r2 ~  d r \ ~  d r * —
=  0  and > 0  unless also t \ =  0 0  and >  0  unless 
also T2 =  0 0 . This follows from the derivatives given above, their symmet- 
ric counterparts, and g  G-,
Hence, there also exist Pareto improving tariff changes (dri, d r 2 , d rj, d r2 ) for 
all ( r i , r 2 , r j , r 2 ), r \  =  r^ =  0 0  and r i  ^  0 0  or r 2 7  ^0 0 . These tariff changes 
are possible if and only if r i  > 0 and T2 > 0. Finally, it is straightforward 
to verify that n  =  r 2 =  r{ =  r j  =  0 0  is also not Pareto efficient since 
there exist possible Pareto improving tariff changes (A r i ,  A r 2 , A t | ,  A r£) 
(e.g. complete trade liberalization). Therefore, only ( r i , r 2 , r j , r 2) such that
(i) ( r i , r j )  =  (any possible r i , 0 ) or ( r i , r j )  =  (0 , any possible r j )  and (ii) 
(r 2 , r j )  =  (any possible r 2 , 0 ) or ( r 2 , r 5 ) =  (0, any possible r£) can be Pareto 
efficient. It is easy to verify that for none of these ( ti ,T 2 , tJ ,T 2 ) there exists 
another ( r i , r 2 , r£, r£) which makes one country better off without making 
at least one of the other countries worse off. Therefore, they are also indeed 
Pareto efficient ■
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4.5.4 A4: Proof o f proposition 7
Proof. By definition, TB*M1 = fiLp1- ” Ga~l -  n ^ - ” G\°~l ) so
that TB*m1 — _________________ ____! _ Also ™*qP- = _________  nr- +
flL n + n J ^ j +ri2^>2 °  n<^ i ° + n i " ’ ^  n+n\tf>1 <7+ n 2 </>2 a
TI*.»i-l— * from manufacturing market clearing at Foreign 1. Hence, n \ =7l<pj “l"7lj
9P +  T^ ZI which implies that A n\ =  0 if and only if A T B =  0. By
T T B *symmetry, also n j =  H which implies that A nj =  0 if and only
if A TB*m  2 =  0. Finally, since n + = 3 ^ ,  A n  =  0 i f  and only if
A n\ =A n j =  0 ■
4.5.5 A5: Proof of proposition 8
Proof. Suppose that the governments have agreed on some arbitrary tariffs 
in the first stage and consider H’s incentives to choose any other tariffs to 
which Foreign 1 and Foreign 2 can respond in a multilaterally reciprocal fash­
ion given that Foreign 1 and Foreign 2 then indeed respond in a multilaterally 
reciprocal fashion. Notice that > 0 at all ( ti ,T 2 ,t* ,T 2 ) if (d r i,d r 2 )
is followed by a multilaterally reciprocal (dr^dr^)- This is because multi­
laterally reciprocal tariff changes leave the number of firms unchanged in all
i
countries (from proposition 7) and G =  p [n +  nj0£-cr +  x~a • There­
fore, H has an incentive to reduce t \  and T2 at any (r i,T 2 ,t^ ,r^ ). However, 
a reduction in t \  is possible if and only if t \  > 0 , and a reduction in T2 is pos­
sible if and only if T2 > 0. Moreover, (i) a multilaterally reciprocal response 
to a reduction in t \  and r 2 is possible unless r \  =  =  0 ; (ii) a multilaterally
reciprocal response to a reduction in only n  is possible unless r \  =  0 ; and 
(iii) a multilaterally reciprocal response to a reduction in only T2 is possible 
unless t 2 =  0. This is because (dri,dT 2 ,d r l,d r 2 ) is multilaterally reciprocal
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if and only if it is such that -gh^dri = ^ t u ^ l - % ~ dTi +
P V^ l ) P \ 2 )
and Jfcrcb -2 =  ^ I ^ r h y dTI +  dT2> from ForeiSn 1>s 811(1
Foreign 2’s manufacturing market clearing conditions. In particular, (i) if 
dri < 0  and dr2 < 0  it must be that dr\ < 0  and/or dr2 < 0 , as follows 
immediately from the above equations; (ii) if dri < 0  and dr2  =  0  it must be 
that dri < 0  and drX > 0  since then —z?dr\ =  — l n + ^ 2 — dr% and
1 2 ( G p T  ( ^ 2  ) <^2~ nI 2
7r?-^S3~dri =  ~ t n * * dT2' (iJi) if dri  = 0  and dr2 < 0 i t  must be ^  ) n  V 2 )  $ 2  nl
that dr? > 0 and drX < 0 since then —^ —zidrX — — (”+f 1 — dr? and
1 2 ( G p T
j—CT (h*~a
2 =  —7—.— ^2 , dr?. Hence, H does not deviate in the second(G1-tr) n  ^ (G? ) 1 ’
stage if and only if t \  =  T2 =  0  and/or r \  = r^ =  0  and/or T2 =  r  J =  0  and/or 
7*1 — r 2 — 0- Moreover, the deviation is otherwise such that t \  =  T2 =  0 
and/or r j  =  Tj =  0  and/or T2 =  r \  =  0  and/or n  =  = 0  after the third
stage. These tariff combinations are efficient (from proposition 6 ) ■
91
5 Conclusion
In this thesis, I theoretically investigated three related aspects of international 
trade and economic development.
First, I presented a model of social learning about the suitability of lo­
cal conditions for new business ventures and explored its implications for the 
microeconomic patterns of growth. The analysis delivered four main results. 
First, firms tend to invest in business ventures with which other firms have 
had surprising success, thus causing development to be ‘lumpy’. One conse­
quence of this ‘lumpiness’ is that improvements in the economic environment 
(policies, institutions, infrastructure, etc.) may map discontinuously into mi­
croeconomic growth. Second, sufficient business confidence is crucial for fos­
tering economic growth and development. If firms have overly pessimistic 
initial beliefs, viable business ventures remain unattempted, whereas overly 
optimistic beliefs never make firms pursue non-viable ventures permanently. 
However, even if initial beliefs are sufficiently optimistic, viable ventures may 
be abandoned if firms misinterpret the evidence available to them. Third, 
development may involve a wave-like pattern of growth where successive busi­
ness ventures are first pursued and then given up until a venture is found for 
which local conditions are sufficiently suitable. Finally, despite this potential 
‘stuttering’ towards a viable venture, there is no guarantee that firms pursue 
the best venture even in the long-run.
Then, I developed a simple general equilibrium model of trade in which 
trade liberalization leads to outsourcing as firms focus on their core competen­
cies in response to tougher competition. Since firms are better at performing
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tasks the closer they are to their core competencies, this outsourcing increases 
firm productivity. Besides establishing this result, I also investigated the links 
between various technological parameters and outsourcing. In particular, I 
analysed how technological progress, changes in fixed costs, and changes in 
internal governance costs affect firms’ integration decisions.
Finally, I developed a ‘new trade’ theory of GATT/WTO negotiations. I 
first argued that tariffs are inefficiently high in the non-cooperative equilibrium 
because countries attempt to improve their relative market access at the ex­
pense of other countries in order to attract manufacturing firms from abroad. 
I then showed how GATT/WTO negotiations can help countries overcome 
this inefficiency by providing new rationales for the fundamental GATT /W TO 
principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination. This ‘new trade’ theory solves 
two important problems of the standard terms-of-trade theory. First, it is con­
sistent with the fact that GATT/WTO regulations do not constrain export 
taxes. Second, it does not rely on the terms-of-trade argument but instead 
emphasizes market access considerations.
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